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 Gatsby and Tort  
Robin West 
America’s novel of the 1920s1 famously depicts an automobile accident in its climactic 
scene.  Daisy Buchanan, a wealthy old-money socialite, is driving a fabulously ornate yellow 
Rolls Royce well over the speed limit2 toward Long Island from New York City.  She sees a 
woman dart into the road.  She swerves to the left to avoid hitting her, but then realizes that this 
has put her own car in the path of an oncoming vehicle in the opposite lane.  She swerves back, 
and strikes the victim, Myrtle Wilson, who dies instantly: "when they had torn open her 
                                                          
1 F. SCOTT FITZGERALD, THE GREAT GATSBY (Scribner Press 1995) (1925). The Great Gatsby is frequently referred 
to both as a distinctive portrait of America, and of the 1920s. For an excellent discussion of both the references in 
GG to the architects of the American Dream, from Benjamin Franklin to Wild Buffalo Bill, and an insightful reading 
of the novel as critical of that dream, see Thomas E Boyle, Unreliable Narration in "The Great Gatsby" 23 THE 
BULLETIN OF THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN MODERN LANGUAGE ASSOC. NO.1,21, 21-26 (March 1969). See also Gary 
Scrimgeour, Against the Great Gatsby, for a harsh assessment of both Gatsby and Carraway's character, in an essay 
that likewise reads the Great Gatsby, perhaps against authorial intent, as harshly critical of the "dangers that     
confront American sentimentality." Gary J. Scrimgeour, Against the Great Gatsby, CRITICISM, VIII, 75-86, Wayne 
State University Press (Winter 1966). See also WALTER BENN MICHAELS, OUR AMERICA: NATIVISM, MODERNISM 
AND PLURALISM 22-60 (Duke University Press, 1995)(discussing Gatsby and the themes of American- styled racial  
insecurity and miscegenation, For a near-classic reading of Gatsby, both the character and the book, as emblematic     
of the virtues of the American Dream, see Barry Gross, Our Gatsby, Our Nick, 14 THE CENTENNIAL REV., 331-340 
(1970) ("Gatsby represents nothing less than wonder itself; the heightened sensitivity to the promises of life, the 
extraordinary gift for hope, the romantic readiness that makes life something more than an extinction up an alley that 
makes life a journey. . .  Gatsby is the hero we need to acknowledge and affirm, but the hero we dare not be.  Nick, 
who is, like us, within and without, simultaneously repelled and enchanted by the inexhaustible variety of life, is the 
hero we can and must become.").  For a discussion of three different interpretations of the American Dream that are 
articulable from Gatsby, in the context of a discussion of the novel's focus on ethnicity, see Peter Gregg Slater, 
Ethnicity in The Great Gatsby, 19 TWENTIETH CENTURY LITERATURE, 53-62 (1973), See also Barbara Will, The 
Great Gatsby and The Obscene Word, 32 COLLEGE LITERATURE 4, 125-144 (2005) (Gatsby's story is "our' story; his 
fate and the fate of the nation are intertwined.  That Gatsby "turned out all right in the end" is thus essential to the 
novel's vision of a transcendent and collective Americanism.").  For a critique of the tendencies of critics to see 
Americanism at the heart of Gatsby, see Benjamin Schreier, Desires's Second Act: Race and The Great Gatsby's 
Cynical Americanism, 53 TWENTIETH CENTURY LITERATURE 2, 153-181 (Summer 2011). For an influential critical 
reading that centers the novel's temporal location in the middle of the 1920s, see Gross, supra. 
2“1. Every person operating a motor vehicle upon a public highway shall drive such a vehicle in a careful and 
prudent manner and at a rate of speed so as not to endanger the property of another or the life or limb of any person. 
2. A rate of speed, by a motor vehicle, . . . in excess of thirty miles an hour for a distance of one-fourth of a mile 
shall be presumptive evidence of driving a rate of speed which is not careful or prudent.”  N.Y. Highway Law 
§287(b) (McKinney 1922) (as amended to January 1, 1918).  
Daisy’s speed is given by one witness as thirty to forty miles an hour, (GG at 147) and by another, who saw the car a 
ways past the accident as fifty to sixty.  (GG at 147)  Gatsby reports that Daisy “stepped on it” after the impact, 
perhaps accounting for the difference.   (GG at 151)  Gatsby also tells Nick that Daisy was feeling nervous in New 
York City, and wanted to drive because she thought it would settle her nerves.  (GG at 151) 
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shirtwaist, still damp with perspiration, they saw that her left breast was swinging loose like a 
flap, and there was no need to listen for the heart beneath." (GG at 145) The "death car," as it 
was called in the newspapers, wavers, but then continues on without stopping, according to a 
witness.  A bit further along, the driver stops the car and her passenger, Jay Gatsby, who is also 
her extra-marital lover and the owner of the car, takes the driver’s seat behind the wheel.  He 
continues on to Long Island.  
The next morning, as you may recall, the victim’s distraught, possibly deranged, but 
unquestionably enraged husband – a car mechanic who is the owner of an auto repair shop and 
the operator of a gas station – tracks down a sometimes-business acquaintance and customer, 
whom he has reason to believe can tell him both the identity and the whereabouts of the owner of 
the car, and therefore, he mistakenly believes, the car’s driver, and hence the man responsible for 
his wife’s death.  He also believes, again wrongly, although not unreasonably, that the car’s 
owner was his dead wife’s lover.  So, on the morning after his wife’s death, Wilson speaks to the 
fantastically wealthy Tom Buchanan, seeking to identify and locate Gatsby. Unknown to Wilson, 
of course, it was Tom himself, not Gatsby, who was his wife’s lover, and it was Tom’s wife 
Daisy, not Gatsby, who was driving Gatsby’s car when it hit and killed Wilson’s wife.  Also 
unknown to Wilson, Gatsby is Daisy’s lover, and much hated by Tom, but Gatsby bears neither 
any illicit love nor hostility toward Myrtle, Wilson’s wife.  Thus, when Wilson asks Tom to 
identify the owner of the car, he, Wilson, is harboring two false beliefs – that the car's owner was 
his wife’s lover and his wife’s killer.  He is also brandishing a gun and clearly intends to exact 
revenge.       
When Wilson asks Tom Buchanan who owns the yellow car and where he can find him, 
Tom tells him.  Tom does not correct Wilson’s misapprehension about the identity of Myrtle’s 
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lover – Tom might not have known his wife was driving the car, but he certainly knew that it was 
he, not Gatsby, who was having an affair with Wilson’s wife.   Nor, more consequentially, does 
Tom warn Gatsby, after Wilson leaves Tom’s estate for Gatsby’s, that his life is in danger.  
Wilson spends the morning wandering from the Valley of Ashes into the lush neighborhoods of 
East and West Egg, onto Gatsby’s estate, finds Gatsby in his backyard pool, and kills him.  
Wilson then kills himself, and as Nick Carraway, our not very reliable and himself ethically 
challenged narrator then notes, the “holocaust was complete.” (GG at 170).  
Nick then comments on this carnage, and more broadly on the events of the summer that 
had precipitated it.  In so doing he judges his cousin Daisy and her husband Tom harshly, in one 
of the most haunting sentences in American literature: 
They were careless people, Tom and Daisy – they smashed up things and creatures and 
then retreated back into their money or their vast carelessness, or whatever it was that 
kept them together, and let other people clean up the mess they had made... (GG at 187-
88) 
  
By contrast to this negative appraisal, Nick somewhat inexplicably exonerates Gatsby 
himself from his otherwise broad denunciation of the moneyed crowd he’d befriended that 
summer.  Although with ambivalence – at various points in the narrative Nick has found Gatsby 
to be nothing but a roughneck, (GG at 53)  a fraud, (GG at 69-70) a bore with an ostentatious 
roadhouse but nothing interesting to say, (GG at 69) and at one point to represent everything he 
holds contemptible (GG at 6) – nevertheless, both at the beginning and the end of the novel, Nick 
basically absolves him. “Gatsby turned out all right at the end,” (GG at 6) Nick tells the reader at 
the beginning of his narrative, and he tells Gatsby himself, the night before Gatsby dies, that 
while Tom, Daisy, and Nick’s sometimes girlfriend Jordan are “a rotten crowd,” that he, Gatsby, 
is “worth the whole damn bunch put together.” (GG at 162) 
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 Nick’s exoneration of Gatsby of virtually all wrongdoing – his judgment that Gatsby is 
“all right in the end” – has pre-occupied Fitzgerald’s professional readers for generations.3 
Gatsby may be, as both Nick and generations of readers both professional and casual have taken 
him to be, a quintessentially American romantic,4 an appealingly self-made and even self-
imagined man,5 an infinitely hopeful innocent corrupted by the dust that swirls around him, a 
sacrificed lamb on the altar of a rigid class and race-based hierarchy, a Dutch pilgrim who sets 
foot on virgin land,6 a trans-raced and oddly disembodied idea of an individual of unaccounted 
ethnicity or color,7 or simply a supernaturally handsome fool utterly in love with a rich girl who 
is out of his class and beyond his reach – all of which Nick clearly believes, and all of which 
Gatsby’s readers have seemingly wanted to believe.  But he is also an adulterer, a criminal with a 
successful business in illegal bonds trading,8 a friend of gangsters who themselves talk casually 
of gangland murders, a bootlegger, possibly himself a murderer, and perhaps most notably –
although not much noted in the scholarly literature – an after the fact abettor, at least, of the hit 
                                                          
3 For a sampling of the poles of the reception of the character of Gatsby himself in the literature, see, e.g., Gross, 
Our Gatsby, Our Nick, supra note 1 (defending both Gatsby and Nick against criticisms of their character, Gatsby as 
representative of an ideal, or hope, or dream, and Nick as representative of moral maturity); Scrimgeour, Against the 
Great Gatsby supra note 1 ("Gatsby is a boor, a roughneck, a fraud, a criminal.  His taste is vulgar, his behavior 
ostentatious, his love adolescent, his business dealings ruthless and dishonest.  He is interested in people -- most 
notably in Carraway himself -- only when he wants to use them.  His nice gestures stem from the fact that, as one 
character comments, "he doesn't want any trouble with anybody."  Like other paranoiacs he lives in a childish tissue 
of lies and is unaware of the existence of an independent reality in which other people have separate existences.  
What lifts him above ordinary viciousness is the magnitude of his ambition and the glamour of his illusion. . . Grand 
this defiance of reality may seem; silly it nonetheless is.").  See also, Colin Cass, "Pandered in Whispers": Narrative 
Reliability in The Great Gatsby, 10 COLLEGE LITERATURE 3, 314-326 (1983) (defending Carraway and by 
implication Gatsby against the charge that Nick is a panderer); Boyle, Unreliable Narration in the Great Gatsby, 
supra note 1, for critiques of both Gatsby and Nick for their involvement in a "corrupt dream."  For readings that 
focus on Gatsby's ambiguous racial and ethnic identity, see, e.g., Slater, Ethnicity in The Great Gatsby, and Schreier, 
Desire's Second Act: Race and the Great Gatsby's Cynical Americanism, supra note 1.   
4 See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 1. 
5 See, e.g., Richard Lehan, F. Scott Fitzgerald and Romantic Destiny, 26 TWENTIETH CENTURY LITERATURE 2, 141, 
137-156 (1980). 
6 See, e.g., Our Gatsby Our Nick, supra note 1 at 336-337 and Boyle, Unreliable Narration, supra note 1 at 24. 
7 See, e.g., Barbara Will, The Great Gatsby and the Obscene Word, supra note 1 at 135 to 140.  
8 For a full discussion of the historical analog of the illegal bonds trading business in which Gatsby was seemingly 
involved, see Allen Boyer, The Great Gatsby, the Black Sox, High Finance, and American Law, 88 MICH. L. REV., 
328-342 (1989).  
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and run accident that kills Myrtle and that so offends Nick, and for that reason arguably as 
culpable of it as Daisy is herself.9 So it is odd that Nick, the book’s narrator and presumptive 
moral center, finds Gatsby lacking in blame for any of this.  Consequently, and perhaps 
unsurprisingly, a substantial scholarly literature has developed, attempting to account for the 
considerable distance between Nick’s unabashed adoration of Gatsby – Nick’s love of his 
romanticism, his “gorgeousness,” his hope, charm, personality, quest, and determination to 
recreate the past if need be in order to capture the future (GG at 6, 116) – and Nick’s own astute 
observations of the criminality, vacuity and self-serving character at the heart of this peculiarly 
large American hero.10   
 By contrast, there is not nearly so much attention bestowed, in the scholarly treatments of 
Gatsby, on Nick’s other central moral judgment of the novel, as quoted above – that Daisy and 
Tom were “careless people … [who] smashed up things and creatures and then retreated back 
into their money, . . . [leaving] other people to clean up the mess.” Perhaps one reason for this 
lack of attentiveness is its accuracy: there is not such a gap between Nick’s assessment of his 
wealthy cousin Daisy and her husband Tom, and the way those characters appear to the reader.  
Tom and Daisy are indeed careless people who destroy creatures and leave others to clean up the 
mess while they retreat into their money – Nick is spot on about that.  Tom maims one lover 
before the commencement of the action of the novel in a separate automobile accident in 
California. (GG at 82) He strikes his mistress Myrtle at another point in anger, carelessly and 
                                                          
9 Commentators have noted that Nick Carraway's refusal to participate in the inquest by sharing his knowledge of 
Daisy's involvement in Myrtle's death renders him an accomplice, see Boyle, Unreliable Narration in The Great 
Gatsby, supra note 1 at 22.  I have not found discussion, however, of the fact that the same is basically true of Jay 
Gatsby himself: of course he was dead by the time of the inquest, but prior to his death and after Myrtle's, failed not 
only to turn the car around (after he'd taken the wheel) and return to the scene, but he also failed to come forward 
with his knowledge of the identity of the driver of the car.  
10 For a striking example of an attempt to do just this, see Dan Coleman, A World Complete in Itself: Gatsby's 
Elegiac Narration, 27 JOURNAL OF NARRATIVE TECHNIQUE, 207-233 (1997).   
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seemingly casually breaking her nose, and literally leaves others to clean up the considerably 
quantity of blood that spills onto Myrtle’s furnishings as a consequence. GG at 41)  Daisy 
complains in the opening scene that Tom is a “hulking brute of a man” who has injured and 
perhaps broken her finger – apparently carelessly, rather than intentionally, but with no 
hesitation or subsequent regret; when Daisy complains of his brutishness and her broken finger, 
Tom only protests her description of him as a hulking brute. (GG at 16) Bad driving – not just 
Daisy's – recurs through the novel as a constant backdrop to the action: Nick’s on again off again 
girlfriend Jordan is such a careless driver, Nick complains at one point, that on one occasion she 
narrowly missed injuring a workman standing nearby, and in fact had come so close to doing so 
that the fender of her car had knocked a button off his jacket. (GG at 63)  A drunken driver after 
one of Gatsby’s parties drives his car into a ditch, although hurting no one, (GG at 58-59) and 
another drives her car over the hand of another partier who is inexplicably but drunkenly lying in 
Gatsby’s driveway. (GG at 66)  Daisy’s carelessness, of course, is the centerpiece of the novel.  
Her reckless driving is one cause of Myrtle’s death   -- Myrtle’s darting out into the street is 
another -- and between the two of them, Daisy and her brutish husband Tom indirectly cause two 
further deaths – Gatsby and Wilson’s own – by first taking no affirmative action to correct 
Wilson’s misperceptions regarding the identity of the driver of the car, and second, with respect 
to Tom, taking no action to correct Wilson’s misperception regarding the identity of his wife’s 
lover and then failing to warn Gatsby of Wilson’s hunt.  Neither Tom nor Daisy have reason to 
want Myrtle, Gatsby or Wilson dead – they harbor no murderous intent toward any of these three 
people – but they also feel no need to take due care that those events not occur.  At the end of the 
carnage, they drive out of the jurisdiction – retreating into their money – leaving others – 
notably, Nick – to clean up the considerable mess they left behind.  Careless is as careless does, 
7 
 
and here, careless does two ruined marriages, a damaged car, a near miss, a broken arm, a "run-
over" hand, a broken nose, a bruised finger, and three deaths.   
So, Nick is famously morally disgusted by all this riotous madcap recklessness; by the 
end of his summer cavorting with the Long Island crowd, he tells the reader, he’d reached a point 
where he’d prefer to see citizens behaving like soldiers, "in uniform and at a sort of moral 
attention forever." (GG at 6) Unlike his varying assessments of Gatsby, furthermore, Nick does 
not equivocate in his judgment of Daisy and Tom and their rotten crowd, nor does Fitzgerald, 
nor, ultimately, should the reader.  Unlike Gatsby, they have no redeeming charm (other than 
Daisy's voice that famously was “full of money" (GG at 127)), and their wealth and carelessness 
pretty much exhaust their shallow characters.  There is no mystery to them, they are as they 
appear: wealthy, thoughtless, shallow, and reckless.  Perhaps because of this, there is 
considerably less puzzlement expressed in the scholarly literature about Tom and Daisy, or the 
overarching vice – carelessness – which Nick identifies in their moral character.  Nick is right to 
condemn them for it; and the reader concurs.  They do wreck lives with their careless disregard 
of the importance, as well as the rights, of others, and they are never held accountable for any of 
it; they do retreat into their money, just as Nick complains.  Nick’s assessment of Tom and 
Daisy’s characters does not, then, give the reader reason to wonder about Nick himself, as does 
his willingness, for the entire summer long duration of his swoon of affection for the book's title 
character, to overlook Gatsby’s criminality. 
But that doesn’t mean that Nick’s haunting judgment of Daisy and Tom and their crowd 
– that they are careless people who wreck things and creatures and then retreat into their money 
and let others clean up the mess – should not give us pause.  Even conceding the strength of the 
case for the endless fascination with the mysterious Jay Gatsby, it seems to me this relative lack 
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of attentiveness to Tom and Daisy Buchanan, and particularly to Nick’s indictment of them, is an 
unfortunate and unwarranted oversight.  First, of course, it is the Buchanans' carelessness, not 
Gatsby's criminality, that so mightily offends Nick as to drive him back to the wholesome 
Midwest.  That alone should make the Buchanans of more interest than is reflected in the scant 
attention they have received in scholarship.  But second, and more to my purposes here, Nick’s 
indictment of Tom and Daisy (and their rotten crowd) should be of interest – and to legal 
scholars as well as literary – because it is an eerily pitch-perfect restatement of the fundamental 
point of the tort, or wrong, of negligence – a part of the body of law that was then referred to as 
"the law of wrongs," and a usage I’ll continue here – as it then existed, at the time of both the 
writing and the action of Fitzgerald's novel.  Consequently, Nick’s assessment of Tom and 
Daisy’s character, and the events that prompted it, provide a glimpse – although perhaps 
inadvertent, on Fitzgerald's part – on the positive, private law of the era – not just the positive 
morality – that governed exactly the sorts of wrongs in which Tom and Daisy so routinely and 
blithely engage. 
Thus, the “carelessness” or recklessness Nick finds and condemns in Tom and Daisy’s 
behavior is loosely synonymous with the more legalistic sounding concept of “negligence” that 
is and was central to the "cause of action" for negligence that had itself come to be understood, 
by the time of Gatsby, albeit only after a somewhat tortured history and considerable 
equivocation, as a stand-alone separate tort; as a freestanding part of the "law of wrongs."  All 
three terms – carelessness, negligence, recklessness – refer at their core, in both legal and 
ordinary usage, to an absence of due care for the rights, safety, interests, or bodies of others.  
During Gatsby's decade, that carelessness, or negligence, so characteristic not only of Daisy's 
driving, but of a number of other drivers in this novel as well, was regarded as a “tort,” by which 
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was meant a legal as well as moral "wrong" for which the wrongdoer, or tortfeasor, should be 
held accountable, and for which the victim should have legal recourse, against the tortfeasor, for 
money damages.   Thus, whether or not he does so knowingly, Nick condemns Tom and Daisy, 
in effect, for being tortfeasors – meaning, then, wrongdoers – and of a pretty egregious sort, too, 
and, more loaded still, wrongdoers who get away with it.  It is that careless, reckless, thoughtless, 
wrongful, and tortious New York and Long Island behavior – not Gatsby's criminality – which 
so disgusts Nick as to prompt his return to his mid-western roots. 
The wrongful torts in Gatsby don't, furthermore, begin or end with Myrtle’s wrongful 
death, or with Jordan’s or the partygoers’ reckless or drunken driving.  Tom is a tortfeasor as 
well, when he breaks Myrtle’s nose, and even Daisy’s finger – these are batteries, for which the 
wrongdoer should be liable to the injured party.11  Someone presumably was at fault for the 
automobile accident in California, in which Tom’s then-lover’s arm was broken. Tom indirectly 
caused Gatsby’s death when he failed to warn him of Wilson’s intention to kill him.  This was an 
act of carelessness at least, if not deliberate malice, although likely not one for which tort law 
would provide relief then or now, as I’ll discuss below. Tom’s affair with Myrtle was also a 
private wrong that would have then been regarded as tortious – a “criminal conversation”  – and 
one which turned out to have particularly disastrous consequences,12 as was Nick’s pandering, 
                                                          
11 “A harmful or offensive contact with a person resulting from an act intended to cause the plaintiff or a third 
person to suffer such a contact, or apprehension that such contact is imminent, is a battery.” Prosser and Keeton, 
supra note 37 at 39 citing Second Restatement of Torts. Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12, 16 (Minn. 1905) (“Every 
person has a right to complete immunity of his person from physical interference of others . . . and any unlawful or 
unauthorized touching of the person, except it be in the spirit of pleasantry, constitutes an assault and battery.”). . 
12 Adultery with one spouse in a marital relationship is known in tort as criminal conversation. The non-spouse is 
liable even if the spouse consented or even initiated the extra-marital relationship. Prosser & Keeton, supra note 37 
at 917. Tinker v. Colwell 193 U.S. 473, 481 (1904) (expressing that because the wife is unable to give lawful consent 
to engage with another man, even if the wife consents to intercourse with another man, the other man has committed 
willful and malicious injury to the husband’s rights and privilege over his wife).; See, e.g., Seiber v. Pettitt, 200 Pa. 
48 (Pa. 1901).  
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which was then a tortious “alienation of affections.”13  This list of torts in The Great Gatsby 
could be considerably extended; there is, for example, also mention of a surgeon's proclivity to 
malpractice, because of his dts-induced shaky hands. (GG at 113)  Wilson falsely imprisons his 
wife in their home prompting her disastrous attempt at escape, and the main characters in Gatsby 
libel each other throughout.  One could easily base a first year torts course around a close reading 
of this book.  It is a virtual catalogue of actionable private wrongs.  The novel is replete with 
torts. 
Yet, and this is the tension I'd like to explore in the remainder of this essay, in this 
American novel that is so replete with torts, and of both the intentional and unintentional sort, 
tort law – the law of private wrongs that was meant then and is still meant today to require 
compensation to victims by tortfeasors for the injuries suffered and the costs imposed by virtue 
of those injuries – is utterly, profoundly, ineffectual.  Nobody sues anybody for anything.  More 
than ineffectual, though, tort law is invisible.  Daisy and Tom (and Gatsby, and Jordan, and quite 
a few partygoers and Nick too for that matter14) may be tortfeasors; I think it’s pretty clear that 
                                                          
13 First recognized in New York, anyone who contrives to persuade or assist an individual in alienating a wife’s 
affections towards her husband is liable. “It consists merely in depriving one spouse of the affections, which is to 
say the love, society, companionship and comfort, of the other.”.Though the spouse must manifest a change of 
attitude by some external conduct or words, it is not necessary to show adultery. Gatsby’s efforts to convince Daisy 
to leave Tom would certainly fall within the category, as would Nick's assistance in that effort. Prosser, supra note 
37 at 918 . See, E.g., Heermance v. James, 47 Barb. 120 (1866);  Callis v. Merrieweather 57 A. 201 (Md. 1904);  
14 As a number of commentators in the sixties, seventies and eighties pointed out, prompting a substantial debate in 
the literature, the otherwise somewhat priggish Nick is a panderer, who facilitates Gatsby’s affair with Daisy.  See 
Cass, Pandered in Whispers: Narrative Reliability in The Great Gatsby, supra note 12 and Nancy Y. Hoffman, The 
Great Gatsby: Troilus and Criseyde Revisited: FITZERALD/HEMINGWAY ANNUAL 148-58 (1971). See also 
Scrimgeour, Against the Great Gatsby, supra note 1 at 81. It is not at all clear what his motives were for doing so, 
but regardless of motive, and whether or not it was pandering, what Carraway did to facilitate Daisy and Gatsby's 
affair was actionable alienation of affection.  The gist of the tort is not sexual intimacy but an interference with the 
marital relation that changes one spouse’s mental attitude toward the other. The defendant’s conduct must have been 
a cause of the harm to the marital relationship, and have acted for the very purpose of affecting the marital relation . 
. . [T]o be liable the defendant must have in some way acted affirmatively…but active participation or 
encouragement by the defendant will be sufficient for liability even if the initiative comes from the plaintiff’s 
spouse.” Prosser, supra note 37 at 919 to 920.  See, e.g., Annarina v. Boland, 111 A. 84 (Md. 1920); Johnson v. 
Richards 1930 Sullivan v. Valiquette Boland v. Stanley 1909, Vogel. Barlwlow. v. Barnes, Watkins v. Lord/ “Norris 
v. Stoenham, Tex. Civ. App. 1932 46 SW2d363  
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they are.  But, there is no mention by either the narrator or the characters of even the theoretical 
possibility of a lawsuit against Daisy (or Gatsby, or Tom) for the hit and run accident that killed 
Myrtle, or against Tom for his batteries, or for his various omissions, or against any of the other 
drivers for their reckless and often drunken and usually injurious driving.  There is no mention of 
the possibility that any of these acts constitute civil, private wrongs, nor is there any mention of 
the body of private law that is supposed to facilitate recompense for them. Tort law – the law that 
should govern these relations, that should force at least a partial righting of these wrongs by 
requiring the tortfeasor to compensate the victim rather than leave others to clean up the mess, is 
entirely absent, both from the characters' dialogue and from Nick's ruminations.  It is absent, in 
short, from consciousness.  To put it melodramatically, torts – again, understood as “private 
wrongs” – pervade the novel, while tort law – the “law of wrongs” – is as absent from the 
entirety of this novel as Myrtle herself is dead at the novel’s end.  
So, why is there no tort law in Gatsby, a novel filled with torts? My answer to this 
question will eventually bring me around to a discussion of the role not only of tort law, but of 
the very idea of tort, and particularly the idea of negligence as an actionable “wrong,” both in the 
novel itself, albeit indirectly, and more important, in the world Gatsby depicts – the "age of 
automobility,"15 as it has come to be called, circa 1925.   My thesis, in short, is that while the 
number of accidents was skyrocketing, during the decade in which Gatsby was both set, written, 
and received, tort law itself – the body of law that should have provided relief for those accidents 
-- was dysfunctional, and it is that dysfunctionality that explains its absence from the 
consciousness of Gatsby’s characters, author, and readers all.  Because of both problems of 
access, and doctrinal barriers, very few of the accidents of the sort involved in Gatsby could have 
                                                          
15 See, e.g., C. SEILER, REPUBLIC OF DRIVERS: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF AUTOMOBILITY IN AMERICA (Chicago Press 
2008). 
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been litigated through to a successful conclusion, and in the sections below, I will detail some of 
those barriers.   
 In fact, as I will attempt to show, by the end of the 1920s – Gatsby’s decade – tort law 
had proven so dysfunctional that the very idea of “tort” as a “wrong,” and the quite specific idea 
of automobile negligence as a “wrong” demanding recompense, had come under sustained and 
scathing attack, and from those who had the interests of victims at heart.  In the half decade 
following the publication of the Great Gatsby, tort reformers argued in a range of fora that the 
very idea of hinging compensation for automobile accidents on any kind of “fault” is misguided 
and counterproductive.  The law should instead, the reformers argued, construct administrative 
mechanisms by which to compensate the victims of automobile accidents, and leave “fault” or 
“negligence” – or “carelessness,” as Nick aptly described it – out of it altogether.  The idea that 
tort liability for car accidents should be based on a moral shortcoming – carelessness – and that 
recovery for them should be guided by principles of corrective justice – the idea, that is, that 
negligence on the roads is a “wrong” that ought to be compensated precisely because it is a 
“wrong” – by the end of the decade, had begun to unravel.   
It was just that soon-to-be discredited moral judgment, though, that Nick’s description of 
the Buchanans so perfectly captures: the judgment, that is, not simply that it is wrong to 
carelessly kill people, but the much more complex and more legalistic idea that it is a wrong for 
Daisy and Tom to do so and then to let others clean up their negligently caused messes, and that 
therefore – albeit only impliedly "therefore" – it would be unjust for a state to permit this state of 
affairs.  Put the other way around, one way to put Nick's insight is that it would be unjust for a 
state not to require recompense for careless lethality.  That Carraway-ian idea – the idea, that is, 
that negligence is blameworthy, and a moral wrong, and therefore a tort, and that justice requires 
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that anyone injured by it have legal recourse to compensation from the wrongfully negligent 
actor – is precisely the idea that was under sustained attack by the end of the decade of Gatsby – 
and indeed in disrepute by the end of the twentieth century.    
The rest of this Essay has two parts.  The first explores tort law and its discontents, 
during Gatsby’s decade, and presents my explanation, summarized above, for the absence of tort, 
both in Gatsby itself and the world Gatsby depicts. It then describes briefly the reform 
movement, led by progressive legal realists, that attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to replace tort 
recovery for automobile accidents with a no-fault compensation scheme.  Although the specific 
reform sought was never fully implemented, the idea behind it – that compensation for 
negligently caused harms should proceed without reference to the fault of the tortfeasor – has 
taken hold, both in the context of automobile accidents and more broadly.  The consequence is 
that we have lost tort law’s traditional moral center; we have lost, that is, the law of torts as a 
“law of wrongs.”   
The second part reckons the costs of this transformation, both political and conceptual, 
and briefly defends traditional “wrongs” and “justice-based” tort law against the charge that it 
reflected overly, and stereotypically, male values.  The conclusion looks briefly at traces of the 
loss of the idea of tort as wrong, in our contemporary legal and political battles.  
I. Torts and Tort Law in Gatsby's World 
The only explanation I have found in the scholarly literature for the absence of tort law in 
Gatsby is in a doctoral dissertation by John D. Rockefeller the V, in which he argues that tort law 
is absent from The Great Gatsby, although torts there are aplenty, basically because that is what 
Fitzgerald intended: Fitzgerald wanted to assert a moral condemnation of Tom and Daisy’s 
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reckless conduct, particularly toward strangers, and even more particularly toward strangers of 
little or no wealth, rather than a legalistic one.16  This is not by dint of Rockefeller’s (or, 
presumably, Fitzgerald’s) unawareness of the contours of the tort law of the time.  In fact, in a 
lengthy and astute legal discussion within a wonderful dissertation that is about much else 
besides, Rockefeller explains that the tort law of the time in which Gatsby is set, rightly 
condemned exactly the sort of behavior found in Gatsby  as both tortious and wrong.  In fact, he 
argues, the common law of tort in the 1920s, to its credit, was well ahead of common morality in 
just that respect.  Relying on a handful of progressive decisions from the time period, 
Rockefeller demonstrates, correctly, that a party could indeed be liable in tort for injuries caused 
through negligent conduct, even if the injured party was not in any sort of contractual 
relationship with the injurer.  By contrast, he argues, in the common understanding of the time, 
one’s moral obligations to others stopped at contract’s end, so to speak.   Tom’s declaration to 
Wilson that “I have no obligation to you,” pretty much summed up the positive morality of the 
era, at least in the minds of the wealthy, and with respect to the obligations they owed the poor.17  
Gatsby, in effect, according to Rockefeller, was in part a brief for Fitzgerald’s view that 
the moral norms of responsibility and reciprocity, as felt by the wealthy, needed to “catch up” to 
the more progressive (in every sense) views expressed by the judicial authors of the common law 
of tort at the time, according to which every individual had well defined legal obligations toward 
all others, sounding in tort, and regardless of the presence or absence of contract.  In contrast to 
the law’s teaching, the lack of any felt moral obligation on the part of the wealthy, for the 
consequences of their reckless behavior, Rockefeller argues, just is the moralistic point of 
                                                          
16 John D. Rockefeller V, Beyond My Eyes Power of Correction: Fitzgerald, Faulkner, and the Past (2008) (PhD 
dissertation) (on file at Johns Hopkins University, UMI Microform 3311835).  
17 Id at ___. 
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Fitzgerald’s American classic, and focusing on the Buchanans’ legal liability for their 
recklessness would have only muddied the waters of that moral condemnation.  Fitzgerald 
wanted his novel to condemn the wealthy for their utter disregard of the consequences borne by 
working class people of their reckless, and often lethally reckless, conduct.  That tort law might 
in fact have held them liable for just that recklessness would have been nothing but a distraction 
from this central moralistic thesis.   
I would like to put forward another possible explanation, not inconsistent with but quite 
different from Rockefeller’s, for the absence of tort law in this tort-filled novel, which concerns 
the nature of the tort law of the time period, rather than anything having to do with Fitzgerald’s 
pedantic ends.  I don’t know what Fitzgerald wanted his novel to teach, with respect to the moral 
obligations of the rich toward the working class.  But tort law might be absent in The Great 
Gatsby, even though torts abound aplenty, not because, or not only because, Fitzgerald wanted to 
direct his readers’ attention to his characters’ moral shortcoming rather than their legal liability, 
but also because tort law itself was largely absent in the world The Great Gatsby depicts – the 
"age of automobility" – even though torts abounded aplenty.   Tort law might be absent from the 
Great Gatsby, in other words, even though the book chronicles so much tortious behavior, in 
part, because tort law itself was stunted, and compromised, and ineffectual, in the mid-to-late 
1920s and early 1930s: the decade in which The Great Gatsby was written, set, and first 
received.  The possibility of recovery in tort for the various injuries the characters in Gatsby 
inflict on each other never occurs to them, and likely never occurred to Fitzgerald or his 
contemporaneous readers, for the straightforward reason that it didn’t occur to the real victims of 
very real accidents, many of whom were in exactly the financial straits of Myrtle Wilson and her 
crazed-with-rage husband.  Although tort law would have proclaimed the conduct in Gatsby – 
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Daisy’s speeding, Tom’s batteries, Gatsby’s adultery, Wilson’s false imprisonment of his wife, 
Nick’s pandering and Jordan’s careless driving all – as wrongful, it so utterly failed to provide 
meaningful access to a functional system of law that would remedy those wrongs, that it was 
simply invisible in the minds of those who deserved and most needed it.   
And why would that be?  Why would tort law be so absent, even in the public 
imagination, particularly if its commands were as progressive as Rockefeller depicts them as 
having been?  One reason, no doubt, was the newness of the tort of negligence in particular.  Tort 
law had been around a good long time, but the tort law of negligence and the cause of action for 
negligence, as an ordinary response to the ordinary occurrence of a negligently caused 
automobile accident, had not.18  But newness doesn’t fully explain it:  it wasn’t all that new, and 
however one might want to date it, the legal doctrine by Gatsby’s decade was relatively clear cut: 
negligent drivers on the road were liable to their victims for the injuries they cause (or to their 
victims’ survivors, in fatal accidents).   
 The absence of tort law both in Gatsby and in Gatsby’s decade can be better explained, I 
believe, by reference to the multiple problems with tort law itself, and not just its immaturity.  
Tort law during Gatsby’s decade, in short, particularly with respect to torts of negligence, was 
both moralistic and judgmental – it loudly and anti-positivistically dubbed negligence a wrong, 
and the tort of negligence a part of the “law of wrongs.”  At that time, tort law, unlike today, was 
squarely grounded in a rough conception of corrective justice:  actors who commit wrongs 
                                                          
18 By the end of the decade, however, the automobile accident had become the cause of most civil law filings, and 
were "flooding the courts," in the minds of some critics and most observers of the tort system.   The most significant 
tort reform effort with respect to automobiles -- the Columbia Compensation Plan authored in the 1930s by a group 
of Columbia and Yale Law Professors and sociologists, which argued for a no-fault system to deal with automobile 
accidents, comparable to the no-fault workman's compensation plans -- was based on both the premise that accident 
victims were woefully undercompensated by the tort system, and that the tort system was being flooded by claims, 
clogging the system.  The reform promised both greater compensation and a reduction in litigation that would ease 
the burden on courts.  See Report by the Committee to Study Compensation for Automobile Accidents to the 
Columbia University Council for Research in the Social Sciences, (1932) at 17-43.  (hereinafter, “Columbia Study”).    
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causing injuries should pay their victims, and the moral “should” in that sentence was the 
foundational center of the cause of action created by the state to ensure that they would.  But the 
law wasn’t as resolute in practice as that theoretical moral clarity might suggest: in practice, it 
proved to be conflicted, compromised, and hypocritical.  If we can anthropomorphize this for a 
moment – appropriately enough, in a comment on a novel that anthropomorphizes machines on 
practically every page – tort law was spineless.  It rendered moralistic judgments about who is 
and who is not blameworthy, but it rarely enforced them.  And because it rarely enforced them, it 
had no presence, and particularly for working class people.  Few people knew about it, or 
instinctively turned to it when injured by a negligent tortfeasor.  It’s not surprising that neither 
Nick nor Wilson would bother to mention the possibility of a lawsuit as a possible reaction to the 
negligent act that caused Myrtle’s death.  It wasn't a part of consciousness. 
Nick himself accurately if unintentionally captures both the moral judgment of tort law 
regarding negligence, as it had developed at the time (and regardless of whether or not Fitzgerald 
knew it) and the law's defining ambivalence when it came to actually enforcing that claim 
against the rich.  As explained above, Nick condemns Tom and Daisy’s brutish and indifferent 
carelessness, in terms that perfectly echoed the tort law’s central moral claim of the young 
century, as it pertained to negligence.  At the end of the novel, though, Nick cannot bring himself 
to take even a symbolic action against Tom that might communicate the depth of his disgust or 
make him pay a price for it.  Given the opportunity to refuse to shake Tom’s hand on a 
Manhattan street in a chance encounter, Nick decides against doing so.  He swallows his moral 
“squeamishness,” as he dubs it, and shakes Tom’s hand.  When so doing, Nick registers 
internally the view that Tom’s recklessness, even though calamitous, is best analogized to the 
recklessness of an infant.  There is accordingly, Nick concludes, no reason to be churlish, and 
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agreeably shakes Tom’s hand, before watching him enter a jewelry store to buy cufflinks.  The 
passage is worth highlighting: 
One afternoon late in October I saw Tom Buchanan.  He was walking ahead of me along 
Fifth Avenue in his alert, aggressive way, his hands out a little from his body as if to fight 
off interference, his head moving sharply here and there, adapting itself to his restless 
eyes.  Just as I slowed up to avoid overtaking him he stopped and began frowning into the 
windows of a jewelry store. Suddenly he saw me and walked back, holding out his hand. 
 "What's the matter, Nick?  Do you object to shaking hands with me?" 
 "Yes.  You know what I think of you." 
 ... 
 I couldn't forgive him or like him, but I saw that what he had done was, to him, 
entirely justified.  It was all very careless and confused. . . .  
 I shook hands with him; it seemed silly not to, for I felt suddenly as though I were 
talking to a child.  Then he went into the jewelry store to buy a pearl necklace – or 
perhaps only a pair of cuff buttons – rid of my provincial squeamishness forever. (GG at 
185-88)  
 
Thus, at least in his own mind, Nick finds Tom morally blameworthy – he can’t forgive 
him – but then releases Tom from personal accountability.  To do otherwise, Nick concludes 
with a weary shrug of his now-mature shoulders would be pointless, Nick apparently concludes, 
as Tom seemingly had only the moral compass of a child.  One cannot deter or even shame the 
Tom Buchanans of the world, they're pretty much forces of nature, so there’s not much point in 
trying.  Just let it go.  And so, Nick spares Tom even the embarrassment of a refused handshake, 
watching him wander into a jewelry store, perhaps to buy cufflinks, and then back across 
jurisdictional boundaries, to carelessly wreck the lives of others.   
 Just as Nick’s negative appraisal of Tom's character mirrored the law's professed 
understanding of the tort of negligence, so Nick’s concluding thought – that Tom cannot at the 
end of the day be held accountable – mirrored tort law’s own ambivalence toward the negligent 
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tortfeasor of the time, and particularly the negligent tortfeasor who happened to be a person of 
means.  In a nutshell: the tort law of the twenties made the right moral judgment – as Nick 
himself had made the right moral judgment – but it had no potency with which to act on it.  By 
decade’s end, the law of wrongs, like Nick, had shrugged its collective moral shoulders in weary 
resignation to the reckless ways of the privileged.  If careless rich people ruined lives and things 
and then retreated into their money, leaving others to clean up the mess, tort law seemed to say, 
there was little that our private “law of wrongs” could do to stop them.  Tort law’s attitude here 
perfectly mirrored Nick’s – the responsible Midwestern bond dealer’s – own. 
So, what had happened to tort law, in Gatsby's world?  How did it become so Nick-like? 
The lack of tort's potency as a vehicle for accountability, I think, can be attributed in part to its 
newness, as discussed above.  Liability for one’s negligence when driving a car was well 
established theoretically, but it had not become a normalized feature of daily interaction, 
including to automobile accidents.  Liability insurance, for example, as of 1925, was required in 
only one state and it wasn’t New York.19  That’s a part of the story, without doubt.  But it’s not 
the entire story.  The impotence of tort was also due to two additional features of tort law itself, 
and particularly as applied to automobile accidents of the sort depicted in The Great Gatsby, of 
the 1920s: first, its inaccessibility, and second, its doctrine.  Both were themselves a function of 
the central obsession of Gatsby: class.  
 i.  Access to Justice 
First, as contemporaneous critics of tort law at the time repeatedly noted, victims of 
automobile accidents in the early twentieth century faced formidable obstacles to recovering for 
                                                          
19  Massachusetts was the only state to require insurance of all automobile owners.  See Columbia Report, at 113-27. 
20 
 
their injuries, even given the theoretical availability of the relatively newly minted "tort" or 
“wrong,” of "negligence."20  To understand why, though, it’s useful to begin with the role of tort 
law in the latter part of the "industrial age" immediately preceding Gatsby’s decade – the “age of 
automobility.”  The late nineteenth century industrial era, as virtually every history of tort law 
amply demonstrates, ushered in a new era of factory-based production, but it also ushered in an 
explosion, sorry for the pun, in the number and severity of devastating accidents, particularly in 
the factories that generated all that production, but also on steamships and on the railroads that 
delivered the factories' wares.21  Many of those accidents, although certainly not all, were most 
assuredly the consequence of the negligence, or carelessness, of someone: typically, in the 
factories, either supervisors who failed to watch for safety violations, or negligent operators of 
machinery, or the negligent design or manufacture of the machines used to generate those goods.  
Victims of all of that industrial era negligence, however – and thus would-be plaintiffs in would-
be tort actions – were disproportionately poor or middle class, without easy access to legal 
representation, and they were often pitted against well heeled corporations.  Even more 
importantly for the development – or lack of development – of tort law during the time period, 
                                                          
20 For contemporaneous discussions, see the Columbia Report, at 25-44 (listing the obstacles as the liability rules 
themselves, evidentiary problems related to the suddenness of accidents and the rapidity with which witnesses and 
evidence scatter, attorney's fees, costs of trial, delays caused by litigation, and second in importance only to the 
liability rules themselves, the judgment proof defendant, where there is no liability insurance), Young Smith, The 
Problem and its Solutions, in Compensation for Automobile Accidents: A Symposium,) 32 Columbia Law Review 
at 788-90, Emma Corstvet, The Uncompensated Accident and Its Consequences, 3 Law and Contemporary 
Problems, 466 (1936).   
21 For an excellent socio-legal discussion of the role of restrictive classical tort doctrine in prompting the 
development of Workman's Compensation Law, see JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED 
WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 43–70 (Harvard Univ. Press 2004) 
and MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1870–1960 THE CRISIS OF LEGAL 
ORTHODOXY 126–51 (Oxford Univ. Press 1992).  Witt treats not only the individualistic and privatistic assumptions 
of 19th century classical, and restrictive, tort law, but also other social determinants of workers' compensation, 
including the "social promise of a new collective solidarity," the ideology of free labor, as well as the resulting 
recalcitrance of union leaders to embrace workplace safety as a dominant concern, and also the rise of actuarial 
tables and “scientific managers of industry”, all as factors in the slow climb away from tort and fault, and toward 
compensation schemes, for workplace injuries. See also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 
467–87, 682–85 (Simon & Schuster, 2d ed., 1985) (1973); and Robert L Rabin, The Historical Development of the 
Fault Principle: A Reinterpretation, 15 GA. L. REV. 925, 940–43 (1981); Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and The 
Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L. J. 1717, 1769 (1981). 
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those would-be plaintiffs injured or killed by malfunctioning and negligently cared for or 
negligently supervised or operated machinery were also more often than not laborers in the 
factories or on the railroads in which those machines were put to use, and therefore the 
“servants” or employees of the party -- the employer -- logically responsible for the injury, as 
were the individuals – fellow employees – who might testify at a trial on their behalf.  The 
potential plaintiffs were, therefore, heavily dependent, and they were often totally dependent, 
upon the continued good will and employment of those who would be the defendants in a 
lawsuit. The injured factory worker would run the risk of alienating not just an “employer,” but a 
community to whom they would have to depend for support, if the family had been rendered 
destitute by virtue of the accident.22  For these reasons and others, injured factory workers were 
reluctant, during the mid-to-late nineteenth century heyday of industrial accidents, to use the 
expanded accident law to seek recovery for the injuries they suffered and wrongs that had been 
done them on factory floors.  As a consequence, from what we can glean from the historical 
record, only a fraction of the accidents that originated in factories, on the rails, or on steamships 
resulted in lawsuits.23   
The automobile accidents of the sort that killed Myrtle and that began to occur in 
alarmingly high numbers in the 1900s and 1910s were seemingly different from the factory, 
railroad and steamship accidents that preceded them in one important sense, or at least so a 
number of legal commentators then argued.24  Whereas the latter pitted the interests, and profits, 
                                                          
22 Thus, as quoted by Witt, one labor leader stated, "when a workman goes to law with his employer, he, as it were, 
declares war against the person on whom his future probably depends." WITT supra note 23, at 55 (discussed more 
generally at 54-57). 
23 WITT supra note 23, at 24-42.   
24 P. Tecumseh Sherman, Grounds for Opposing the Automobile Accident Compensation Plan, 3 LAW AND 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 598, 599-601 (1936); Austin Lilly, Criticism of The Proposed Solution, in Compensation for 
Automobile Accidents: A Symposium, 803, 804-07 (1936).  See generally, Richard Nixon, Changing Rules of 
Liability in Automobile Accident Litigation, 3 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 476 (1936).  
22 
 
of one fairly discrete economic class – consisting of employers, rail companies and steamship 
companies – against another economic class – employees and passengers – and thus, to a large 
degree, capitalists against laborers, automobile accidents were at least in theory class-blind.  A 
driver one day could be a pedestrian the next, and a defendant one day might be an injured 
plaintiff the next.  And, in further contrast to industrial accidents, victims of automobile 
accidents were not typically economically dependent upon the negligent actors that might have 
injured them.  Automobile accidents, and presumably the apparatus of law designed to permit 
recovery for injuries related to them, should thus – again in theory – have operated in a more 
egalitarian manner: there was no obvious systematic obstacle to recovery, based upon the gross 
economic inequality of the plaintiff and defendant classes.  Those classes were porous.  Anybody 
could find themselves in either situation, and might even at any time find himself in both 
simultaneously.  There should have been no class-based reason for the courts or anyone else to 
stack the deck against plaintiffs, or to impose unwarranted obstacles against the act of bringing a 
lawsuit. 
Nevertheless, in practice, by the onset of the age of automobility, the disuse and 
inaccessibility of the tort system for accidental harms caused by machinery may well have 
become a feature of daily life.  But second, and particularly at the end of the nineteenth and 
beginning of the twentieth century, in the decades prior to Gatsby’s own, and as alluded to in 
John Simon's Foucauldian history of the time period, Driving Governmentality, auto accidents 
did have a discernible class tilt shared with the industry-era accidents that preceded them, that 
has simply been lost to us over time.25  When automobiles began to appear at the turn of the 
                                                          
25 Commentators on the rise in auto accidents and accident-related court cases routinely note that in the aughts and 
teens, cars were a luxury item, owned primarily by the wealthy.  By the twenties, cars were owned by some working 
class people as well, or by parties with enough assets to buy a car on a loan, but not enough to either purchase the 
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century in significant numbers, drivers tended to be wealthier than pedestrians, even if not by 
definition or all of the time, and most accidents then, unlike today, involved drivers against 
pedestrians, not drivers with other drivers.  There weren't that many cars, and there were plenty 
of pedestrians, most of whom were not accustomed to obeying rules of the road.   Furthermore, 
and as commentators in The Nation, The Atlantic Monthly, and eventually in law reviews noted, 
a high percentage of automobile accidents, particularly in the nineteen-aughts, fit The Great 
Gatsby mold to a tee: children of the rich in expensive cars out on a lark, striking down working 
class pedestrians, while recklessly exceeding safe speeds, and only occasionally stopping , before 
crossing jurisdictional lines, thus avoiding all accountability.26  With respect to this sub-class, 
then, auto accidents, at least during the nineteen-aughts, were not that different, politically, from 
the industrial accidents that had immediately preceded them.  Victim-pedestrians tended to be 
poor or from the lower reaches of the middle class, and both they and their families were often 
economically devastated by the direct and indirect costs of a sudden automobile accident.27  A 
lawsuit was typically beyond financial reach.  Drivers tended to be wealthier than victims, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
car outright or obtain liability insurance.  Thus, Simon suggests that car ownership by the time of Gatsby blurred 
class distinctions, and uses Gatsby itself to great effect to illustrate the blurring.  He also notes, however, that at least 
according to commentators of the time, car owners were inflicting grievous harms on pedestrians, and were reaping 
all the profits and pleasures from car ownership while being burdened with none of the costs.  See Simon, Driving 
Governmentality at 565, quoting Weld Rollins from a letter, entitled  A Proposal to Extend the Compensation 
Principle to Accidents in the Streets, 4 Mass. L. Q. 392 (1919).  To similar effect, Simon shows, Herbert Ladd 
Towle, in the Atlantic Monthly, decried the "new-rich owner, made arrogant by success, and the spoiled sons and 
daughters of rich parents. . . have property, but without responsibility. . . . the greatest need of the owner today is for 
the social feeling that accords courtesy and fair play to one's neighbors on the road. . . . : Simon, Driving 
Governmentality at 537, quoting Herbert Ladd Towle, Motor Menace, 137 The Atlantic Monthly 98, 98-99 (1925). 
26 See commentators id, and contemporaneous commentators cited and quoted by Simon, including Edward Weeks, 
A Criminal in Every Family, 140 Atlantic Monthly 445 (1927), Robert Marx, Compulsory Compensation Insurance, 
25 Columbia Law Review 164, 167 (1925) and Russell Holt Peters, Death on the Highway, 93 Forum 179(1935), 
Editorial: The Automobile's Death Toll, 114 The Nation, March 1922 at 279 and A J Bracken, The Aftermath of 
Sudden Death, 27 Readers Digest 53 (1935).  
27 Emma Corstvet, who worked as a social scientist on the Columbia Plan, details the devastation on financially 
strapped families caused by automobile accidents in her short but powerful defense of the Plan, in The 
Uncompensated Accident and Its Consequences, 3 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 465 (1936). 
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found it relatively easy to retreat into their money, and walk away from the mess they had made 
of the lives or bodies of others. 
 By the time of Gatsby, however, this class tilt had shifted considerably: in part because of 
the spread of loan agreements, working class people such as Tom and Myrtle Wilson 
increasingly owned cars themselves.  Nevertheless, class continued to play an outsized role in the 
accessibility of the law, and hence justice, to those injured by cars. Then as now, the plaintiff in 
any tort action, including automobile accidents, bore various burdens of proof: first a burden of 
going forward, and eventually a burden of proving his allegations by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  In the context of a car accident a la 1925, the logistical and financial costs of these 
burdens could be, and typically were, prohibitive. The plaintiff was required to show by a 
preponderance that both the defendant bore some fault, and that the plaintiff him or herself was 
free of fault.  This was usually simply not possible, even if it was true and no matter how 
egregious the negligence.  The aftermath of an accident was chaotic, with no sophisticated 
science of accident-recreation.  Witnesses faded, without having given eye-witness accounts.  
Nobody exchanged licenses and insurance information on the spot.  The evidence that could be 
gleaned from the damage to a car or a human body yielded very little.  Plaintiff pedestrians such 
as Myrtle did not typically have insurance that would have born these litigation costs.  And 
finally, if somehow the plaintiff did prevail, the chances of actually enforcing a judgment were 
negligible.  At the time of Gatsby, only Massachusetts had a mandatory insurance law.28  Drivers 
who had borrowed money to buy the car, even if proven negligent in court and found liable by a 
jury, might have no assets to which a resulting judgment could attach.  If so, again, there would 
be little reason to go forward. 
                                                          
28 See Columbia Report at 21.  
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 In other words, no matter how blameworthy the driver, no matter how blatant the 
negligence, and no matter how serious or fatal the injury, there often wasn’t much point in 
bothering to sue.  As a consequence, while tort actions for recovery for the injuries and fatalities 
caused by accidents were seemingly “flooding the court system” and “clogging the dockets,”29 
when compared with the total number of civil actions, nevertheless, when compared to the total 
number of accidents, they were relatively rare events, and enforceable judgments even rarer, and 
for reasons that would have directly limited the ability of people like George Wilson to even 
contemplate bringing an action on his own or his wife’s behalf.  Like many victims of industrial 
era accidents, Wilson was financially dependent upon the business of the husband of the party 
most responsible for the accident, and also like many of those victims, that dependency was not 
reciprocated with a feeling of mutual responsibility.  Tom felt no moral sense of obligation to 
Wilson, in fact he felt nothing but snobbish contempt for him.  As Rockefeller insists in his 
dissertation (although for another reason),30 Tom Buchanan tells Wilson midway through the 
novel that “I don’t have to sell you my car . . . I have no obligation to you whatsoever.” (GG at  ) 
But more fundamentally, even had Tom and Daisy, on the one hand, and Wilson on the other 
been strangers, without the possibility of the sale of the car binding them in at least partial 
privity, it's hard to imagine the lawsuit by a real analogue of Wilson; he lived in the Valley of 
Ashes in impoverished conditions on a shoe string, with no cash on hand for hiring a lawyer or 
financing a lawsuit.  He was awaiting the proceeds of the resale of a car that he had not yet even 
purchased, but which had been promised to him by the husband of the woman that killed his 
wife.  The witnesses to the accident faded away, and the police reconstruction of the accident at 
the scene was wildly inaccurate. (GG at 126) Even had Wilson known all the facts, not been 
                                                          
29 See Columbia Report at 36 to 37, and Patterson French, The Automobile Compensation Plan: A Solution for some 
Problems of Court Congestion and Accident Litigation in New York State, Columbia Press 1933, at 10-32. 
30 See note 28 supra. 
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deranged, and had a willing and competent lawyer, he would not have had sufficient 
independence to dare a lawsuit.  The Buchanans were hardly pressed to even consider providing 
compensation to Wilson or his estate, either before or after Wilson’s own suicide.  They were 
spared even the annoyance of offering to pay for the funeral; there would be no funeral for this 
wife of a working class man who was himself dead by his own hand.  Daisy drove off, in the 
immediate aftermath of the accident.  After the dust had cleared in the Valley of Ashes, Daisy 
and Tom too drove out of the jurisdiction, and as Nick tells us, leaving no forwarding address. 
(GG at 127).  
 ii.  Doctrinal Compromises 
The second reason tort law lacked presence in Gatsby’s world stemmed from the 
compromised doctrine itself.  Most consequential, the then well-entrenched rule of  “contributory 
negligence” led to the dismissal of unknown numbers of actions for recovery for auto accident 
losses. Plaintiffs in auto cases were (and of course still are) oftentimes also careless, and that 
carelessness often contributed, causally, to either the occurrence of the accident or the severity of 
the harm, or both.  Under the traditional "contributory negligence rule," where there was even a 
sliver of negligence on the part of the plaintiff, or “contributory negligence,” the action would be 
dismissed, even in the face of much greater negligence, and with a much more direct causal 
impact, on the other side.  Plaintiffs in automobile accidents in the age of automobility would 
lose, then, if the “law” was faithfully applied,31 in cases in which they were only slightly at fault, 
even where defendant's fault was far more egregious.32  This state of affairs continued well into 
                                                          
31 Which it often times was not, if the case was before a judge and jury sympathetic to the plaintiff’s plight.  This 
was noted both by the supporters and critics of the existing law.  See e.g., Richard Nixon, Changing Rules of 
Liability in Automobile Accident Litigation, 476-77 (1936). 
32 As noted by virtually every author on the topic in any way connected to the Compensation Plan.  See, e.g., P 
French, The Automobile Compensation Plan, note 96 supra at 38, Corstvet, Uncompensated Accident and its 
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the 1970s, when state legislatures began the laborious process of supplanting the common law’s 
rule of contributory negligence with various, and varying, comparative negligence regimes, 
which tied plaintiff’s fault to a reduction in recovery rather than a bar, depending upon the 
degree of plaintiff’s negligence, bringing the basic law of tort recovery closer to the dictates of 
moral and common sense. 
In the 1920s, however, the contributory negligence rule was the major doctrinal means, 
although not the only means, by which otherwise meritorious automobile accidents could be 
dismissed.33  Pedestrians such as Myrtle who ventured into the road were contributorily 
negligent, and could not recover for that reason alone, unless a jury or judge was willing to 
“nullify” – as in ignore – that relevant law (and at least some juries and judges, and perhaps 
many, were willing to do just that).34  It was not, however, the only rule limiting recovery.  Of 
course, the plaintiff had to prove both defendant’s negligence and his own lack of negligence,35 
and proof might be extremely difficult or expensive to come by: in a case arising from 
negligence on a highway, as noted above, the aftermath of accidents was chaotic at best.  But 
additionally, if a plaintiff rather than a defendant had the “last clear chance” to avoid an accident, 
and didn’t make use of it, that would bar recovery, even in the face of defendant’s negligence.36  
In some states, if the plaintiff was a passenger of the negligent defendant, that fact alone, because 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Consequences, 3 Law and Contemporary Problems, note 88 supra at 467-68, and Shippen Lewis, The Merits of the 
Automobile Accident Compensation Plan, 3 Law and Contemporary Problems at 588. 
33 Nixon, note 33 supra at 482-83. 
34 Nixon, id. 
35 During the twenties, states were split on who had the burden of proving the plaintiff’s contributory   
 negligence, or its lack.  Rabin supra note 23, at 942 & 947.  
36 The reverse was also true: if the plaintiff had been contributorily negligent, but the defendant had the last clear 
chance to avoid the accident, the defendant would be liable.  Last clear chance in other words trumped the 
negligence rules.  LCC proved impossible to define with any precision (unless it is simply a type of negligence) and 
common law courts eventually abandoned it, although in some states more rapidly than in others.  See generally 
Nixon, supra at 33 . 
28 
 
of worry over fraudulent claims between spouses, would bar recovery.37  If the injury suffered by 
the plaintiff was the result of fright occasioned by a close brush – such as a heart attack or 
miscarriage prompted by a near miss – but with no physical contact the lack of physical contact 
would be a bar to recovery.38  If the defendant's negligence was a cause of the accident but not 
the most "proximate cause" – the definition of which has never, after 150 years of debate, been 
made clear – even a clearly negligent defendant would be shielded from liability.39  And if the 
plaintiff were him or herself in violation of a state law – such as crossing not at a crosswalk or 
walking on the wrong side of a street or highway – that fact as well could sometimes bar 
recovery under the so-called "per se" doctrine, even if it could be shown that the statutory 
violation might not have been itself unreasonable given the circumstances.40  And finally, no one 
was ever liable for so-called "omissions" rather than commissions, even if those omissions were 
negligent – because of the force of a more general and idiosyncratically American principle of 
private law, to wit, that no one is ever required to take any action to actually help someone.  
Therefore, there cannot be liability for failing to help someone else avert harm, even if not doing 
so looks literally care-less, in the automobile context or in any other.  
 Given this doctrinal background, look again at the torts in Gatsby.  Although I stated 
above that the novel is replete with torts, it is more correct to say that the novel is replete with 
tortious behavior – on closer look, there may not be a single apparently tort-like act, either 
                                                          
37 Nixon has a good discussion, at 489-90. 
38 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N.Y. 107, 110 ( N.Y. 1896) (holding that there can be no recovery for 
injuries from fright occasioned by another’s negligence) (overruled in 1961). See also, O’Brien v. Moss, 220 A.D. 
464 (1927). 
39 See, e.g., Silver v. Silver, 50 S.Ct. 57 (1929) (ruling that a Connecticut statute barring recovery from automobile 
owners and drivers for gratuitous passengers is not unconstitutional). Higgins v. Mason 174 N.E. 77 (N.Y. 1930) 
(ruling that an automobile driver is not liable unless he knows of a dangerous condition, realizes that it involves an 
unreasonable risk, believes that guests would not be able to realize the risk, and fails to warn them). 
40 See, e.g., Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164 (N.Y. 1920) (holding that plaintiff killed in an accident where he did 
not turn on his headlights and defendant was driving on the wrong side of the road could not recover due to the 
decedent’s contributory negligence). 
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intentional or unintentional, in Gatsby, whether or not it led to physical injury, that would have 
actually been recoverable even in well-funded lawsuits.  Daisy’s possible negligence in the hit 
and run accident that killed Myrtle would have been trumped by Myrtle’s contributory 
negligence in darting out into the road, no matter how fast Daisy was driving or how slight or 
inadvertent Myrtle's infraction.  George Wilson, then, would not have recovered a dime for 
Daisy’s wrong against Myrtle even had he hired a lawyer and brought suit.  Nor could there have 
been an action against Gatsby, the owner of the car, for allowing Daisy to drive, even though she 
was visibly distraught when she took the wheel, because of proximate cause limitations.  The 
other accidents recorded or mentioned in the novel would also likely not yield any recovery.  The 
accident in Gatsby’s driveway, in which one drunken partygoer ran over the hand of a second 
drunken partygoer, would have been equally barred by the contributory negligence of the latter.  
Jordan’s near accident that led Nick to accuse her of being a bad driver, in which a worker’s 
button was nicked off but there was no other physical contact, would have been barred, even if it 
led to fright-induced physical harm, because of the lack of physical contact.41  Tom's West Coast 
girlfriend might have been barred by the "guest doctrine" that prohibited passengers from suing 
drivers.42  Tom's failure to correct Wilson's misapprehension regarding the extent of Gatsby's 
moral turpitude, and his possibly more consequential failure to warn Gatsby that he was in 
danger, could not have been torts of any sort: they were omissions rather than commissions, for 
which tort law has steadfastly refused recovery, and were not proximate causes in any event.43  
                                                          
41 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N.Y. 107 (N.Y. 1896).  See also, Miller v. Baltimore & O.S.W.R. 
Co., 85 N.E. 499 (Ohio 1908). 
42 See, e.g., Massaletti v. Fitzroy, 228 Mass. 487, (1917) Bailey v. Brown 34 Ohio St.2d 62 (1973); Brown v. Merlo 
8 Cal.3d 855 (1973).  See generally James J. Woods, Jr., Guest Statutes: Goodbye and Good Riddance 16 CUMB. L. 
REV. 263 (1986), for a history of the automobile guest statute history..    
43 See, the Restatement of the Law second (torts 2d) § 314 : the fact that the actor realizes or should realize that 
action on his part is necessary for another’s aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such 
action.” See also Prosser & Keaton (1984) (early common law was resistant to acknowledging ‘nonfeasance’ as 
opposed to ‘misfeasance’ difference between active misconduct and passive inaction or a failure to take steps to 
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The causal chain between Tom's omission and Gatsby's death, any court would have held, was 
"cut off" by the intervening act of Wilson himself.44  Tom’s breaking or bruising of Daisy’s 
finger would have been barred by spousal immunity doctrines.45  Tom and Daisy and their rotten 
crowd might have been careless people, in Nick's judgment and the law's judgment both.  Both 
the devil is in the details, and in this case, what the devil shows is that Tom and Daisy would 
have gotten off scot free, not only in Nick's private mental calculation but in the law's quite 
public one as well. 
 Thus – perhaps a well functioning legal system, with a highly regarded and 
democratically generated law of wrongs grounded in principles of corrective justice, could have 
prevented some of the carnage of this holocaust, as Nick dubbed it: I believe it could have.  If 
Wilson had had meaningful legal recourse against either Daisy and her husband or Gatsby, and 
knew it, he might have been reconciled to that avenue of relief, rather than moved to take 
personal revenge.  If Myrtle could have gotten a restraining order against her abusive husband 
because of her wrongful imprisonment perhaps she wouldn’t have darted out into the road.  If 
Jordan and her reckless friends faced real threats of lawsuits rather than only fanciful ones, 
perhaps they wouldn't have been so cavalier regarding their own negligent and drunken driving.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
protect them from harm.).  On the proximate cause defense, see Ryan v. Central RR (the remote act of the defendant 
cannot be a cause for liability); Christianson v. Chicago, St. P., M& O.R. co. 67 Minn 94 69, NW 640 (1896); 
Palsgraf 248 N.Y. 339 (1928).  
44 See, e.g., Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp. 51 N.Y.2d 308 (1980) (“Where the acts of a third person intervene 
between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury.  . . liability turns upon whether the intervening act is a 
normal or foreseeable consequence of the situation created b the defendant’s negligence. If the intervening act is 
extraordinary under the circumstances, not foreseeable in the normal course of events, or independent of or far 
removed from the defendant’s conduct, it may well be a superseding act which breaks the causal nexus.”) Suagerties 
Bank v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 141 N.E. 904 (N.Y. 1923) “A wrongful act is not a proximate cause unless it is in 
clear sequence with the result and unless it could have been reasonably anticipated that the consequences 
complained of would result from such act, and such sequential relation does not exist if ht consequences were only 
made possible by the intervening act of a third party, which could not have reasonably been anticipated.”) Scheffer v. 
Washington City V.M. & G.S.R. Co., 105 U.S. 249 (U.S. Va. 1881)  
45 Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N.Y. 106, 22 N.E.2d 254, 256 (1939); Caplan v. Caplan, 268 N.Y. 445, 198 N.E. 23, 24 
(1935); Weicker v. Weicker, 28 A.D.2d 138, 283 N.Y.S.2d 385, 388 (1st Dep't 1967), aff'd, 22 N.Y.2d 8, 290 
N.Y.S.2d 732, 237 N.E.2d 876 (1968); Fine v. Scheinhaus, 202 Misc. 272, 109 N.Y.S.2d 307, 312 (Sup.Ct., 
Onondaga County, 1952). (“At common law they could not maintain actions against each other”).  
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But this was not a well functioning legal system, and the law of wrongs was so thoroughly 
compromised as to be dysfunctional.  Wilson had no law-based recourse against either Daisy or 
Tom or Gatsby for his wife's death, regardless of whose hand was on the wheel.  His ability to 
finance a lawsuit would have been nil.  His ability to prove Daisy’s speed would have been zero, 
and would have been trumped by Myrtle’s contributory negligence in any event.  Even assuming 
he could marshal the resources to do so, his chances of recovery would have been zero as well, 
had he been able and inclined to file.   
 To sum this up: the attitude of the law of torts of the 1920s toward the by-this-time 
paradigmatic unintentional tort – negligence on the roads leading to injury or death – turns out to 
be like nothing so much as Nick Carraway’s stance, ultimately, toward Tom and Daisy: a sharp 
moral judgment, followed by a resigned shrug of the shoulders, when the question turned to 
actual accountability.  Accidents were extraordinarily common and extraordinarily lethal in the 
age of automobility: there were about three fourths as many fatal car accidents in the nineteen-
teens as there were in the 1990s, with a half of the population.46  Recklessness and negligence, 
tort law proclaimed, are wrongs – not unlike assault, battery, and so on – for which recompense 
should be due, and had done so for seventy years.  Tort law – the law of private wrongs – 
included within its scope injuries caused by reckless disregard of the safety of others, or by a 
lack of due care with respect to their rights and interests.  Tort law, then, were we to take it at its 
word, should have been able to both provide relief to victims, hold wrongdoers accountable, and 
not just incidentally also stem, by deterring, the rising tide of accidents.  But – it didn't.  
Lawsuits, both for industrial accidents and the automobile accidents that followed, compared to 
                                                          
46 According to Jonathan Simon, about 30,000 Americans died in automobile accidents in 1930.  In 1995, the 
number of people killed in car accidents was 41,800.  The population in 1930, according to the United States census, 
was about 122,775,000, and in 1990, about 248,709,000.    Jonathan Simon, Driving Governmentality: Automobile 
Accidents, Insurance, and the Challenge to Social Order in the Inter-War Years, 1919 to 1941, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 
521, 525 (1997–98). 
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the number of accidents, were rare, and recovery was even rarer.  A panoply of rules and 
practical constraints made recompense next to impossible.   
 The wealthy and careless American tortfeasor – the Tom or Daisy Buchanans of the early 
part of the century – was judged blameworthy by the tort law on the books of the era, as 
engaging in wrongful and reprehensible conduct by virtue of his negligence.  He was then almost 
never held accountable.  There was no significant likelihood of a lawsuit, or, if a lawsuit was 
filed, no real danger of liability.  The law shrugged its collective shoulders as the negligent 
tortfeasor, more often than not, retreated into the privacy of his money.  The wealthy tortfeasor, 
as Nick said, was more like a will-less force of nature, or an infant, than an adult responsible for 
choices who should be held accountable.  The sorry state of tort law, no less than Nick Carraway, 
facilitated the retreat.   
 Tort law, then, is absent in Gatsby, and in the minds of its narrator, characters, and 
contemporaneous readers, at least in part, because tort law was absent in Gatsby’s world – the 
age of automobility.   From 1850 to the date of the novel, accidents there were in abundance, but 
they were accidents without accountability.  It is not surprising, then, that it simply didn’t occur 
to many of the people involved – victims, tortfeasors, most likely Scott Fitzgerald himself, his 
readers – to think about holding these people accountable for their wrongs through the 
mechanisms of law.  Why?  Not because of law's basic norms: tort law had a century earlier 
proclaimed negligence an actionable wrong.  Rather, I would venture it was because of tort law's 
dysfunctionality.  That dysfunctionality became acute when the number of wrongful accidents 
skyrocketed – and therefore, when the effect of its bite, had it had one, would have actually been 
felt, first in the profits of industrialists, and a bit later, during the age of automobility, as an 
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interruption to the enjoyment of luxury – including the luxury of an automobile – by the 
privileged class.  
 
c.  The Death of the Law of Wrongs 
The contrast between the ideological core of tort law – what we can call, following 
Ronald Dworkin’s suggestion,47 tort law’s “point” – during the age of automobility – Gatsby’s 
decade – and our own, is stark.  At the beginning of the twentieth century, as John Goldberg and 
Benjamin Zipursky histories have recently reminded us,48 tort law was called a “law of private 
wrongs” and it was called that for a reason: the word “tort” after all means “wrong.”  The point 
of the “law of tort,” is to facilitate compensation to a victim of a wrong by the wrongdoer.  For 
the state to fail to right that state of affairs, and demand payment by the wrongdoer to the victim, 
would be an injustice.  Tort law – the law of wrongs – is thus a requirement of justice.  Contrast 
that with the understanding of the point of tort law that prevails today, and has since the 
beginning of the last quarter of the twentieth century.  The phrase alone – “law of wrongs" – 
today sounds like a curio.  That the word “tort” means “wrong” is better known by crossword 
puzzle mavens than tort students or lawyers.  Tort law is no longer understood as a means by 
which a victim achieves private recompense against a wrongdoer that has injured him.  In a tort 
action today, certainly in theory and more often than not in practice, the question is not whether a 
private individual wronged another through carelessness, and if so, how much he should pay.  
Rather, the question is quite different: the question is whether the cost of preventing whatever 
accident that occurred, viewed ex ante, would have been lower or higher than the cost of injury 
                                                          
47 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 87–88 (Belknap Press 1986). 
48 John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917 (2010). 
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times the likelihood of the accident’s occurrence.  Liability is placed accordingly, but placing 
liability is hardly the point of the enterprise.  Rather, the point of the body of law in its entirety, 
with respect to unintentional torts, is to articulate accident-cost minimizing rules that will guide 
strangers – meaning actors who can’t settle these matters efficiently by contract – toward an 
optimal allocation of the costs of the risk of accidents before they occur: if the cost of preventing 
an accident is lower than the likelihood of the accident times its likely cost, then the actor should 
absorb the cost and prevent the accident.  If the cost of the accident itself is lower than the cost of 
preventing it, however, the victim should bear that cost him or herself.   
The purpose of the lawsuit, then, is not to compensate victims of private wrings, or to 
hold wrongdoers accountable, but rather, to provide an opportunity for a court to articulate less 
general versions of the principles of allocation cited above: it’s cheaper, for example, for 
motorcyclists to wear helmets than for the rest of us to take all precautions to avoid hitting them, 
therefore failure to wear a helmet is contributorily negligent, but it’s cheaper for motorcycle 
manufacturers to place side guards around the footrests than for riders to . . . and so on.  The 
plaintiff himself in such an action is basically the mechanism by which these rules can be 
articulated.  The actual compensation to the plaintiff, however, is hardly “the point;” rather, the 
plaintiff’s compensation is entirely incidental, and the plaintiff himself is simply a convenient 
vehicle for the achievement of other social ends.  The idea that causing a harm to another 
through carelessness is a wrong, for which justice demands recompense to the victim by the 
wrongdoer, and for which, therefore, the law should require compensation, is just not a part of 
the calculation.  Tort law, in effect, has been morally neutered.  Tort law seeks efficient 
allocation of accident costs, not recourse for victims of wrongs they’ve suffered at the hands of 
private parties.  Another way to put it is simply that the idea of a "wrong" has been dropped from 
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the idea of a "tort" and the idea that the point of the enterprise is to demand, in accord with 
justice, that wrongdoers pay those they wrong, has disappeared entirely.  We don’t care, so much 
anymore, whether the wrongdoer retreats into his wealth and lets others clean up the mess.  Thus, 
the transformation of the tort law from a law of wrongs mandating compensation and 
accountability for those wrongs, to a body of law, the point of which is to seek an efficient 
allocation of resources toward the minimization of the costs of accidents and their risks.   
In the past decade a handful of torts scholars – and most notably Professors Goldberg and 
Zipursky from Harvard and Fordham Law Schools respectively – have begun to unearth the 
multiple reasons – jurisprudential, political and philosophical – for this extraordinary 
transformation, over the course of the twentieth century, of the point of tort law, and more 
specifically, the transformation of negligence law as a part of the “law of wrongs,” into a body of 
law the point of which is not to hold the negligent party accountable, but to allocate efficiently, 
and ex ante, the costs and risks of accidents.49 One reason for that transformation which 
Goldberg and Zipursky don't explore, however, but which is directly pertinent here, is the 
profound inadequacy of the law of wrongs, at least the inadequacy of that body of law as a 
vehicle for compensating accident victims, first in the industrial age, and eventually in the age of 
automobility as well.  Just when a “law of wrongs”, or tort law understood as a law of wrongs, 
might have most mattered – when it could have and should have become the body of law that 
would guarantee the compensation of victims of accidents caused by the negligent conduct of 
industrialists and automobile drivers, and, by so doing, cut into first the profits of industrialists 
and then the wealth and luxury of the privileged class – it didn’t.  It drew back.  Again, only a 
minority of negligently harmed accident victims in those decades were compensated through tort 
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law, both in the nineteenth century with respect to factory, steamship and railroad accidents, and 
in the early twentieth century with respect to automobile accidents.  The compensation provided 
through tort law for negligently caused accident injuries was a drop in the bucket compared to 
the costs of the accidents themselves.  The result was not surprising, at least in retrospect: as 
more and more factory and auto accident victims went uncompensated or undercompensated, tort 
law in its entirety – the law of wrongs – came under attack, and it came under attack, not only or 
even primarily from capitalists unhappy with the prospect of liability, or from court mavens 
worried about the “clogging of the courts,” but from progressive-era advocates for the wronged, 
both in the legal academy and in the political realm.  The inadequacies of tort law as a vehicle for 
compensating accident victims eventually became a staple of progressive criticism of early 
twentieth century law and capitalism.  And it became a staple of progressive criticism, basically, 
because it had failed.   
As is well known, the most visible, lasting and important fruit of the progressive era 
dissatisfaction with tort law, were the workman’s compensation laws, eventually passed in all 
states, guaranteeing some measure of recovery to workers injured on the job, and without the 
need of proving negligence, traded off for a schedule of benefits lower than what would 
theoretically be available in a successful tort based lawsuit.50  In a less familiar history, but as 
ably told by torts scholar John Simon in his Foucauldian history of the era, Driving 
Governmentality,51 a similar effort was made two decades later, with respect to automobile 
accidents, culminating in the publication in 1932 of “The Columbia Study on the Compensation 
                                                          
50 WITT supra note 23, at 195. 
51 Simon, Driving Governmentality, at 569-585. 
37 
 
of Automobile Accident Victims.”52  Authored primarily by Shippen Lewis, a member of the 
Philadelphia Bar, and a number of Columbia and Yale law professors,53 and supported with the 
work of a number of contributors from the then nascent social science of the study of accidents, 
the Columbia Report urged policy makers and state legislators to adopt a compensation scheme 
for automobile accidents comparable to that already embraced in the workman’s compensation 
laws, and with basically the same underlying bargain: drop the tort system entirely, the Columbia 
Report authors urged, and substitute in its stead the “Columbia Plan.”54  The Columbia Plan the 
authors detailed, explicitly mimicking the workers compensation plans, would establish an 
administrative compensation system in place of tort law, under which recovery for the costs of 
automobile accidents would be guaranteed, although the amount would be capped at stated 
levels.   Compensation would come from mandatory privately held insurance.  Most important to 
the authors of the report, though, the need to show negligence and the absence of contributory 
negligence would be abolished.  The authors vigorously and repeatedly eschewed the principles 
underlying the common law negligence regime; disclaiming all reliance on moral principles of 
"right."55  Rather, compensation should be premised upon the "reality" that automobile accidents 
                                                          
52 Hereinafter, Columbia Report (1932).  My edition states that a copy of the report can be had for 1.00 by 
Addressing the Committee to Study Compensation for Automobile Accidents, Commercial Trust Building, Phil. Pa. 
53 The director of the project was Shippen Lewis.  Advisers included Dean Charles Clark of Yale Law School, who 
gave advice on the Connecticut case studies in particular, Elwyn King and Charles Samenow of Yale who  presented 
analyses of court record studies, Walter Dodd of Yale contributed his expertise on workmen's compensation law, 
Professor Ralph Banchard of Columbia contributed expertise on insurance, Prof. Noel Dowling of Columbia Law 
School gave the constitutional analysis, and Dr. Francis Deak of Columbia Law School presented material on 
foreign law, and Dorothy Thomas of Yale, Frank Ross of Columbia on the analysis of statistics.   
54 Columbia Report, at 199-216 (Conclusions). 
55 Columbia Report at 160 ("The Committee believes that the principle of negligence is a principle of social 
expediency, and that it is not founded on any immutable basis of right.") and at 212 ("The Committee believes that 
the principle of liability for fault only is a principle of social expediency, and that it is not founded on any 
immutable basis of right.  The Committee has therefore tried to learn what actually happens when this principle of 
fault is utilitized, and to estimate, so far as possible, what would happen if the principle of liability without fault 
were applied.  The value of either principle is to be tested by its results rather than by a priori moral 
considerations.")  See also Shippen Lewis, The Merits of the Automobile Accident Compensation Plan, 3, Law and 
Contemporary Problems, at 588 ("the compensation theory springs from a more realistic view of the problem than 
does the liability theory.") Patterson French, The Automobile Compensation Plan, at 45-47; Young Smith, 
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are ubiquitous and unavoidable in a complex post industrial society.  All accident victims would 
thus receive some compensation: those injured by defendant’s negligence, those injured by a 
combination of defendant’s negligence and their own contributory negligence, those injured by a 
non-negligent defendant in which the victim was the only negligent party, and those injured in 
accidents for which no negligence on either side existed or could be proved.  The “point,” of the 
compensation plan, as was true of the workers compensation plan that was its model, would be to 
compensate accident victims.  It would not be to mandate that wrongdoers compensate victims 
for the wrongs they caused. 
For various reasons, the Columbia Plan never enjoyed the success of the workers’ 
compensation statutes.  No-fault did not become the norm and still is not the norm, in the 
automobile context, as it did, and is, in the context of workers’ injuries.  Why did it fail?  
According to later historians, there were multiple reasons.  First, by the time of publication of the 
Columbia Plan in 1932 automobile accidents lacked the clear class tilt of factory accidents, so 
there was not as sharp a political movement pushing for the reform.56 Automobile ownership had 
become somewhat democratized, thanks in large part to sophisticated loan agreements, and were 
increasingly becoming a necessity.57  The project also ran out of money, and was plagued by 
various forms of "researcher bias" from the start: the researchers tended to focus on the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Compensation for Automobile Accidents: A Symposium, in 32 Columbia Law Review, 785 (1932), at 785, 788, and 
797.  
56 The authors and supporters of the report wrote at length on the point that unlike workers' compensation statutes, 
on which the automobile compensation plan was analogized, there were not two discrete classes involved in 
automobile accidents.  They did so basically to refute the suggestion that the existence of two discrete classes in a 
precondition of no fault regimes. See generally Symposium, Compensation for Automobile Accidents, 32 Columbia 
Law Review, at 805-7.  They did not seem to foresee that the lack of a discrete class of automobile injury victims 
might, though, present political obstacles to the plan's success in the legislatures.  According to a number of 
historians, however, this is what happened.  See Jonathan Simon, Driving Governmentality, 4 Connecticut Insurance 
law Review 521 (1998) at 585-86.    
57 Simon, id at 578-88. 
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inadequacies of tort law in dealing with calamitous injuries, which skewed their findings.58  Most 
influential though, were the bar associations, which included both the plaintiffs' bar, and the 
lawyers for the fledgling insurance industry, all of whom were already making a serviceable 
living off of accident law cases.59  There was nothing comparable with respect to workers’ 
injuries, which had never constituted a decent living for any slice of the bar, either plaintiff or 
defense based.  "Vested interests in the status quo" with respect to car accidents, as one of the 
authors put it, prevented the Columbia Plan from being enacted into law.60   
In spite of the Columbia Plan’s failure, though, the substantial seed of doubt to which it 
gave voice regarding the tort system, elaborately argued in the Columbia Report itself61 as well 
as the literature it spawned,62 had been planted.  Central to the critique on which both workers 
compensation plans and the Columbia Plan was based, was the basic idea, given a full treatment 
in the Columbia Study, that  “liability based on fault,” in both the automobile context and 
workplace contexts, ill-served accident victims, and for essentially the same set of reasons.  A 
"law of wrongs" that viewed liability as triggered by a finding of fault as determined by a court 
of law was inadequate to meet the needs of those injured in accidents that were either caused by 
negligence that was improvable, caused by negligence but which was nevertheless non-
compensable because of contributory negligence or other doctrinal bars, caused by provable 
                                                          
58 For a history, within the context of a discussion of the tensions on the Committee between the social scientists, 
who were interested in the development of methodology promised by the Report, and the lawyers, who were 
interested in law reform, see John Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science, at 105-09 
(1995).  I thank Dan Ernst for the reference. 
59 Jonathan Simon, at 586.  
60 See, e.g.,  James Fleming, Compensation for Automobile Accidents, 59 Columbia Law Review 408 at 423.  ("The 
human tragedy indicated by the dry statistics of the Columbia Study . .. escapes the popular mind.  No political 
pressure group is interested in playing it up, and there are many vested interests in the status quo.  Publicity and 
drama exist, but only for the spectacular verdict or settlement.  This makes the present system appeal to the 
gambling spirit so strong in American culture..... And there is great and highly motivated opposition to 
compensation from the ranks of plaintiffs' lawyers. . . ")   
61 See Columbia Report, note 56. 
62 See authorities in note 57, 60 and 62  supra. 
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negligence and not barred by defenses but for which either the plaintiff lacked the resources to 
bring suit or the defendant lacked resources or insurance making a judgment meaningless.  Most 
damning of all, however, in the minds of critics, tort law as a “law of wrongs” is simply and 
utterly irrelevant for the victims of accidents that were “blameless” – not caused by negligence at 
all.  The bargain proposed in both the workplace and the automobile context as an alternative to 
tort – in both workman’s compensation schemes and in the Columbia Plan – was, then, to 
dispense with the very idea of wrong, and blameworthiness, and the idea of a “tortfeasor,” and 
instead guarantee some measure of recovery tied not to a "wrong" at all, but instead, more 
simply, to an administrative showing of the fact of the accident leading to injury.  The premise of 
both plans, in other words, was that compensation should be tied not to fault, or the commission 
of a wrong, at all, but rather, to need: the need of the injured workman or auto accident victim to 
sustain himself and his family over the duration of the disability.   
The idea of recompense-for-a-wrong was basically jettisoned by the progressive reform 
movements in favor of compensation-for-accidents.  According to the workman’s compensation 
laws that set the template, and the failed Columbia Plan that used it as a model, it should not be 
the commission of a “wrong” that should prompt liability, whether or not justice requires that 
wrongs be righted.  The Columbia Report was very explicit about this.63 Moral factors, such as a 
defendant’s wrong, or a plaintiff’s right, should not, the authors declared, be salient factors in 
determining who gets compensated for automobile accidents, they should not even be relevant 
factors.64  Rather, it should be the fact of an “accident” that leads to an “injury” that causes 
demonstrable need, which should prompt not liability, but compensation, as administered by an 
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administrative body, not a court of law.  And it should do so, finally, in the interest of sound 
public policy, not justice. 
The adoption of workmen's compensation schemes was a clean, if limited, victory for 
workers injured on the job, and the partial adoption decades later of some of the key principles of 
the Columbia Plan in some states was similarly a victory, albeit more limited, for drivers, 
passengers and pedestrians injured by automobiles.  Both have their points of origin in 
progressive era and legal realist generated critiques of the idea at the heart of the law of wrongs: 
that liability for accidental injury should pivot on personal wrong, and be grounded in norms of 
corrective justice.  Both were motivated, largely, by a sense of the corrosive social injustice as 
well as the broad based suffering occasioned by a system that could cavalierly turn its back on 
those injured in ways not captured by those norms.  Both, eventually, prompted schemes of 
recovery for accident victims more responsive to need, more streamlined, less dependent on 
courts, and more broad-based, than the highly individualistic systems they replaced.  
II.  Tort Law Then and Now 
Let me turn now to a comparative assessment of tort law – and the idea of tort law – in 
Gatsby’s era, and tort law – and the idea of tort law – now.  The tort law of Gatsby’s era, 
according to a wave of critical, left wing, and third wave feminist legal criticism from the 1970s 
through the 90s, was, at the time, like Tom, a bit of a brute.65  During that time, the judicial 
authors of the common law of tort imposed restrictive rules of causation and duty, narrow 
definitions of negligence and expansive definitions of contributory negligence, all of which 
jointly shrunk the communitarian and other-regarding duties of tort law to a bare minimum, 
                                                          
65 See Leslie Bender, An Overview of Feminist Torts Scholarship, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 575 (1993); Lucinda M. 
Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women’s Issues in a Torts Course, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 41 (1989). 
42 
 
while the scope and potency of the self-serving and individualistic – more Tom-like – law of 
contract, in which no one owes anyone anything if they’re not contractually obligated, grew.66  
Strikingly, tort law refused (and still refuses) to impose a duty to help or rescue others, even 
when the cost of doing so was (or is) miniscule.67  Acts of omission, rather than commission, 
then and now, cannot be the basis of liability.   Liability was limited to those who had most 
“directly” or “proximately” caused harm, without ever giving content to that limitation, and 
refused to unequivocably universalize the obligation of due care beyond the borders of contract 
and narrowly defined “duties” until well into the twentieth century. Most important, the 
negligence rule itself obviously restricted tort liability to those accidents provably caused by 
negligence.  Those caused by non-provable negligence, as well as those not caused by negligence 
at all were simply not subject of law’s concerns.  A shrunken tort law combined with an 
expansive law of contract to fuel a private civil law that trumpeted the social utility of 
entrepreneurship, that celebrated industry, hyper-individualism, and capital, while aggressively 
neglecting the communitarian or feminine values of caregiving, of reciprocated responsibility, 
and the relational needs of vulnerable people, of dependents, and victims.68  Tort law itself, 
although fundamentally imposing a feminine-sounding communitarian duty of other regarding 
care, nevertheless imposed constraints on its reach that exhibited an over-regard for masculine 
values.   It was uncaring in the extreme.   It was brutish. 
                                                          
66 Compare MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1870–1960 THE CRISIS OF LEGAL 
ORTHODOXY 61–63 (Oxford Univ. Press 1992) and Richard L. Abel, Torts, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A 
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 445 (David Kairys ed., 1998). 
67 See, e.g., Hurley v Eddingfield, 156 Ind. 416, 59 N.E. 1058 (Ind. 1901). 
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Although the 1970s-90s feminist or critical language for this judgment was not available, 
the tort reformers of the 1930s who authored the Columbia Report, would very likely have 
concurred in its large outline.  Tort law was inadequate to meet the needs of victims of the age of 
automobility.   By requiring cause, fault, acts of commission, and the right sorts of injuries, thus 
limiting recovery to those cases, it deprived victims in extreme distress of needed assistance.  
Most restrictive, of course, was the fault requirement itself: it did indeed hold negligent parties 
liable for the consequences of their actions, but precisely because of its fastidiousness on that 
point, it let off the hook all who caused accidents but who could not be found negligent, either 
because they weren’t negligent, or their negligence could not be proven, or because even their 
provable negligence was trumped by their victim’s negligence.   As a consequence it made 
paupers of a large class of victims.  It was, in a word, heartless; it cared greatly for compensatory 
justice, although perhaps more in theory than practice, but it cared not one whit for the survivors 
of accidents such as that which killed Myrtle, where both actionable negligence and a lack of 
contributory negligence could not possibly have been proven, even in a well-funded lawsuit.  It 
cared even less for victims of those accidents that had their genesis in events that were indeed 
caused by human acts but were entirely free of negligence.   Those victims, in Justice Holmes’s 
famous or infamous dismissal, were no more deserving of recompense than victims of random 
lightening strikes,69 and should be treated the same, meaning, of course, that like victims of 
lightening they should be left to fend for themselves; the loss of non-negligently caused harm 
should stay where it initially fell.  Tort law was, then, to this degree, itself “uncaring,” even 
though it was premised on a duty of care: by requiring a breach of that duty of care as a condition 
of liability, the Columbia Report argued, it showed itself uncaring toward the much larger class 
of victims that were injured not through a provable breach, but injured, or killed, nevertheless.  It 
                                                          
69 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW, 96, (1881). 
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cared too much, we might say today, for an “ethic of justice,” with its focus on compensation for 
wrongs, and not enough for an “ethic of care.”  The compensation system for which it argued 
would, then, dispense with the ideal of justice, and the ethic of individualized responsibility it 
entailed, and embrace the ideal of care instead, with its focus on communitarian bonds. 
Individuals should take due care, but the law should care for victims, rather than dole out justice 
to those lacking requisite character.  Thus – the need for compensation schemes, rather than tort 
law itself, as a morally superior way to deal with accident costs. 
The Report thus urged that we displace a moralistic tort law that premises recovery on 
individual acts provable negligence, with a compensation scheme that provides for some 
measure of recovery regardless of fault, and thereby expand the number of victims who will 
receive some measure of compensation for devastating accident costs hugely.  Replace the 
moralistic tort system with a compensation system that responds to the needs of victims, and 
does so regardless of outmoded conceptions of “fault.”   This would be a move toward a more 
caring society.  A more caring society, after all, should not abandon those in extreme distress, 
and should not do so regardless of whether that distress is the result of another person’s fault.   
Nevertheless, to the degree we’ve acted on this impulse  – to the degree we have 
displaced a moralistic, justice-based, idea of tort law, in favor of a care-based, communitarian, 
and needs-focused compensation schemes – that displacement comes with a high price, and to 
both sexes.  Let me end with just a brief listing of what some of those costs of this century-long 
ongoing reform movement might be.  What is the price of abandoning the law of wrongs, 
moralistic though it might be, and replacing it with compensation schemes, either with respect to 
automobile accidents alone, or across the board?  
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One part of the price of this reform movement is conceptual and cultural: by jettisoning 
the moralistic understandings of tort law, and of the moralistic, tort based duty of reasonableness 
at its core, we lose the content, and hence the teaching, of an elastic legal norm of minimal, 
required, civil conduct toward each other.  Again, in terms of the novel, Daisy’s indifference and 
Tom’s brutishness were both aspects of the carelessness that Nick and tort law both condemned.  
Tom and Daisy are both, and more or less equally, culpable.  Nick, the novel, and the law of 
wrongs all, managed to get at least that much exactly right.   Likewise, when we trade a moral 
reckoning of conduct, backed by law, for greater compensation for victims, we lose not only a 
conception of the character flaws behind negligent conduct, but also a robust conception of the 
virtue of reasonableness it requires: non-brutish carefulness in one’s conduct, with a due regard 
for the consequences one’s conduct might visit upon others.  By jettisoning the traditional 
conception of the law of wrongs, we may have rid ourselves of an overly gendered and overly 
moralistic set of norms that came replete with unjust limitations.  But to whatever extent the 
teaching of that body of law loses rhetorical and cultural force, we inherit in its stead a legal 
world that teaches, to some measure, the acceptability of an androgynous indifferent brutality. 
That is no small loss.  When we give up on the law of wrongs, in essence, we lose the 
moral force of an articulated body of law which, however badly it did so, sought to hold people 
accountable for their careless acts that wreck lives and create messes, rather than permit them to 
retreat into their money.  Nick Carraway’s initial judgment, in brief, about the wrongness of 
Daisy and Tom’s carelessness, was right, and a cost of the reform movement that followed its 
utterance was that it obscured that judgment, no less than it obscured the hypocrisy of the law 
that tried to put it in effect.  Carelessly wrecking lives is a private wrong that deserves 
recompense, and corrective justice does demand that a state not permit a wrongdoer to retreat 
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into his or her private money, and let others clean up the mess.  By conflating the "problem" of 
uncompensated victims of wrongful negligence with uncompensated victims of all accidents, and 
then defining the mess that's left behind as a social problem, the solution of which is to provide 
compensation for victims of accidents regardless of fault, both the fault of the individual who 
exhibits that carelessness, and the injustice of a system that fails to hold him accountable, is in 
effect whitewashed.  The wrong of negligence is swallowed by the costs of accidents, and the 
injustice of the state's failure to address fault is swallowed in the larger "social problem" of the 
uncompensated costs of accidents that occur regardless of cause.  There may, then, be more 
compensation all around: victims of automobile accidents and industrial accidents, no less than 
victims of lightning strikes and hurricanes all need health care and economic support.  If the 
negligently caused accident, however, is indeed a wrong, then it is a compounded wrong – an 
injustice – for the state not to treat it as such.   
The second cost is political.  The manifest inadequacy of the law of wrongs for 
automobile accident victims had two root causes, not just one, which the Columbia Report 
repeatedly blurred; sometimes explicitly, sometimes not. It would have been a gain, at least in 
terms of the clarity of the century long reform movement that followed it, to have separated them 
out.  First, the law of private wrongs failed some accident victims on its own terms: accident 
victims who were victims of someone else's negligence, but who for various practical and 
doctrinal reasons, could not recover.70 Plenty of victims of clearly negligent action received no 
compensation whatsoever, because of practical, procedural, or doctrinal barriers to recovery.    
But second, the tort regime of the time did not even purport to address the problems of victims 
of non-negligently caused accidents.  It was the sheer size of this latter group, with their utterly 
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Accident Compensation Plan, 3 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. at 584-87 (1936). 
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noncompensable-even-in-theory injuries, that was at the heart of the critics’ case for the 
inadequacy of tort-law-as-a-law-of-wrongs.71  Faultless victims of non-negligent accidents were 
entitled to no recovery at all, even in theory, because they had not been the victim of a “wrong.”  
And there were many such accidents.  Mark Twain had observed seventy years earlier that 
victims of steamboat accidents as often as not had “no one to blame,” when a machine, rather 
than a human, had caused the injury.72  The same was true, seemingly, of the victims of factory 
machines and automobiles.   A tort regime focused on the commission of wrongs did not even 
address – whether or not fairly – the injuries of those hurt through some chain of events in which 
there was "no one to blame."73 The ratio of the tiny numbers of plaintiffs who successfully 
recovered in tort law for a “wrong” done them in a negligently caused accident, compared to the 
number of maimed or killed workers in factories, and workers and passengers on the rails, and 
eventually pedestrians killed by cars, who were not recognized at all by a system that was 
myopically focused on "wrongs," was wildly disproportionate.  It was also, eventually, 
politically unsustainable.    
Blurring these two problems however – the inadequacy of the law, with respect to victims 
of negligence, and the law’s failure to compensate at all victims of non-negligence – as both the 
workers compensation reports that preceded it and the Columbia Report repeatedly and explicitly 
did, blurred two hugely different forms of injustice.  The first – the failures of the law of wrongs 
to compensate clear and deserving victims of wrongful negligence, because of the cost of justice 
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or the effect of unduly restrictive rules – is a failure of legal justice. If someone has wronged you 
in a way the law recognizes, there should be recompense.  A legal system that fails to do so or 
that is so tilted towards the interests of defendants as to make the promise that it will do so 
illusory, is an unjust system.  The second, though, – the failure of the legal system to provide any 
relief for victims of non-negligently caused harms, whether on the roads or in the factories – is a 
failure of social justice. If the law should provide you with compensation for these harms – 
whether the harms are caused by disease, or accidents, or the natural catastrophe, or poverty – 
and doesn’t, that is a social injustice, and should be rectified politically, by the enactment of law 
that does so.  Conflating these two different forms of injustice into one overarching social 
problem, as the Columbia Report did with respect to negligently and non-negligently caused 
accident costs, was politically (and morally) problematic, in part simply because it understates 
the magnitude of the social injustice of which non-negligently caused accidental injury is simply 
a part.  Non-negligently created accidents became a problem for tort law, because of the close 
resemblance of non-negligently created accidental injury and negligently created accidental 
injury.  It looks, simply, odd to compensate the latter but not the former, if one is focused on the 
fact of the injury – a victim injured through a non-negligently caused chain of events is, after all, 
just as injured, just as in need, as a victim injured through negligence.  Myrtle is just as dead as 
she would have been had the accident been entirely Daisy’s fault.  But if this is a problem that 
must be rectified because of concerns of horizontal justice, then other injustices loom:  what is 
even more unjust, if horizontal equity is our concern, is compensating injuries caused by 
workplace or automobile accidents, but not compensating sicknesses caused by unhealthy 
conditions in the workplace.  More unjust still, once we expand a compensation scheme to pick 
up workplace disease as well as injury, is compensating injuries and sicknesses caused in 
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workplaces as well as compensating for all automobile accidents regardless of fault, but not 
compensating for non-negligently caused injuries caused in other locales, such as schools, 
homes, or public sidewalks.  If that is compensated, then other horizontal inequities emerge: why 
not compensate, simply, for illness, as measured by the extent of the disability?  And, if we 
compensate for illness, or disability, then why don’t we compensate for equally crushing 
poverty? 
But this is just a bizarre way to approach problems of social, rather than legal injustice. 
Getting to an acknowledgement that we need a more robust safety net for people in distress 
through an ever expanding compensation scheme, itself originating in an insight about an 
apparently failure of horizontal justice – that negligently caused but not non-negligently caused 
accidents are compensated by a fault system – is just torturous, and at any rate, it is not a path we 
managed to traverse: compensation schemes stalled with workman's compensation, and limited 
no-fault for automobile accidents prevailed in only a handful of states.  The idea has hardly 
spread like wildfire, and even where it did it’s a mixed blessing: compensating for accidents in 
the workplace and to a lesser degree on the highways with no need to show fault, might have 
legitimated, rather than highlighted, the complete privatization of health costs on the ill and their 
families (as left wing and Marxist critics of the workers’ compensation schemes predicted it 
would).  We continue to believe Holmes' teaching about the undeservedness of victims of 
random harms to any law-based relief, albeit with some narrowly carved exceptions: victims of 
some sorts of accidents caused in some places by non-negligent events, are deserving of help 
from the rest of us, but victims of misfortune otherwise – whether of lightning strikes or cancers 
or household accidents or crushing poverty – must be left to their own devices.  Solving the 
problem of some non-negligently caused accidental injury costs through a re-jiggering of the tort 
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system thus might have obscured, and certainly did not cure, the injustice of a system of public 
law that fails to provide a right to health care for disease or injuries regardless of their cause.  
Thus, one result of blaming the tort system for not providing a means by which the victims of 
non-negligently caused injuries can be compensated, is that the social injustice of not granting a 
right to health care is further obscured, and political efforts to correct that injustice might well 
have been frustrated.  
The last problem, though, or cost of the scuttling of the law of wrongs, returns us to 
Gatsby.  Conflating the problem of under-enforcement of tort law even where there is 
demonstrated negligence, and the lack even in theory of any mechanism for compensating 
injuries which occur in the absence of any wrongdoing, obscured for Gatsby’s decade and that 
which followed it, the legal injustice of the restrictive tort rules that so badly compromised the 
law in the first place.  The progressive reform movement's response to tort law’s inadequacy was 
basically to urge a compensation scheme that swallowed the harm of negligently caused harms 
with other harms, thus leaving completely unacknowledged, rather than only badly half 
acknowledged, the injustice of the law's cribbed accounting of the contour of the private wrong 
in the first place. The result was a reform movement, no less than the law it criticized, that 
embraced, rather than was at least a bit embarrassed by Nick Carraway's attitude toward Tom at 
the end of The Great Gatsby: reformers argued for limited compensation of victims, but not from 
wrongdoers, and not for wrongs but rather, for a compensation scheme that explicitly subsumed 
the moral wrong of carelessness and the injustice of not enforcing norms against it within the 
larger “social problem” of accident costs, and explicitly collapsed the injustice of accidents 
caused through legal wrongs for which the law fails to guarantee compensation, with those 
caused innocently.  The wished for reform would clearly serve, albeit in a limited way, the need 
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for compensation: Obviously if drivers are unaccountable for the harms they cause, and if those 
harms involve injury and death of such a magnitude as to dwarf the injury and death of two wars, 
then yes, those uncompensated injuries will eventually become a social and political problem.  
There must be at least some limited compensation for the victims of drivers’ carelessness, lest 
there be intolerable unrest – and thus the need for "compensation schemes" – after the law of 
wrongs’ demise. Limited compensation of victims from the public purse, however, does not 
address the injustice that is the subject of The Great Gatsby and of Nick's insight, and that is the 
injustice of leaving the reckless and often wealthy tortfeasor unaccountable – the injustice, that 
is, of permitting the Buchanans to retreat into their wealth, leaving others to clean up the messes 
they leave behind.  If anything, it exacerbates it, by erasing even the idea that that 
unaccountability is a wrong requiring a state response.  
Conclusion 
In 1883, Mark Twain, commenting on the steamship accidents that caused thousands of 
deaths, including that of his brother, remarked that there was seemingly "Nobody to Blame."74  
He might have meant that literally: that the steamships' machinery caused accidents without 
human will, such that no one was blameworthy for this class of accidents.  Or he might have 
meant it figuratively: that the legal and political framework of the era left no one accountable for 
their blameworthy conduct.  The context of his remark doesn't help resolve the ambiguity, and it 
has been interpreted by subsequent Twain scholars both ways.75  In 1925, Scott Fitzgerald, 
through Nick Carraway, clarified, somewhat, the ambiguity in Twain's remark.  Nick found 
plenty of blame to go around for the accidental wreckage by machines of creatures' lives, which 
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the Great Gatsby chronicles.  Machines don't cause accidents, Nick can be read as reporting in 
his one and only moment of moral clarity in the entire novel, people do: the people who drive 
them, or operate them, or make them, or design them, or put them on factory floors, or on the 
seas, the rails and the highways, and who profit from them accordingly.  Neither Nick nor the 
law, however, could fashion a way to hold the Buchanans and their crowd accountable.  Nick 
allows Tom to retreat into his money, leaving others to clean up the considerable mess, not even 
imposing the sanction of a moment of embarrassment on a public street.  The law forgave the 
Buchanans of Gatsby's world for much more. 
The depressing cyclical dynamic of Nick's relationship to the Buchanans – his 
chronicling of their carelessness that wrecked creatures' lives, followed by their retreat into their 
private money, his judgment of their blameworthiness, and then ultimately his failure to hold 
them accountable  - should feel dreadfully familiar to American readers: it portrays a slice of 
America that wound up being at least as pervasive as the hypnotically compelling dynamic of 
Nick's relationship to Gatsby, with its own cycle of admiration and contempt for Gatsby’s 
transgressive criminality.  Nick, the responsible Mid-western bonds dealer, gave the Buchanans, 
with their inherited wealth, a pass, basically, on liability for the injuries and deaths that were the 
consequence of their madcap riotous summer.  Plenty of other responsible community leaders, 
both bonds dealers and otherwise, have done likewise, over the decades that followed the 
publication of Gatsby.  In fact, the tortfeasor that gets away with it, leaving others – notably, 
taxpayers, if not victims themselves – to clean up the mess, and who then retreats into his money 
and drives off out of the jurisdiction, evading both liability and accountability to the bloody end, 
has become as much an American fixture of the hundred years since Gatsby's time, as the 
criminal who charmingly flouts the law but winds up dead in the last act.   
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The moneyed class has carelessly or recklessly imposed harms and injuries on the rest of 
us likely from the dawn of time, but in our own history it has done so most dramatically, most 
publicly, and most egregiously in the two Gilded Ages that framed the twentieth century.  In the 
first, from the industrial revolution through the beginnings of the age of automobility, it was the 
carelessness of those who profited from steamships, railroads and factories, and those who 
enjoyed the luxury of wealth that wrecked lives without accountability; In the Gilded Age we're 
now enjoying or suffering, depending on our class, it is the carelessness of financiers, that have 
recklessly endangered millions of people's financial lives while enriching that of a few.76  Banks 
and financial institutions are "too big to fail,"77 we’re told, in a phrase whose ambiguity directly 
echoes that in Twain's complaint from the 1880s: does "too big to fail" mean that there's truly no 
one who should or could be held to account for the crisis, because of mechanisms beyond human 
will, or does it mean that our legal and political institutions are just not willing to take on the task 
of holding those that are that big, accountable?  Is the machinery of finance, like the machinery 
of steamships, now beyond human agency?  Or rather, is it perfectly clear today, as it was to 
Nick in Gatsby's world even if it wasn’t to Twain in his, to whom and how to assign blame for 
this catastrophe – indeed, journalists and historians seem to be doing a fairly good job of it – but, 
rather, our mechanisms of legal accountability that are lacking?  If the latter, then it seems to me 
that those responsible for the law – that would be us – are basically in Nick's shoes; shaking 
Tom’s hand, and declining to testify at the inquest into the deaths that his cousin, her lover, and 
her noxious husband all jointly caused.  Perhaps also like Nick, we are as quiet as we are so as 
not to jeopardize the value of our own legitimately acquired bonds.  Nick Carraway, the 
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77 ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT 
TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM—AND THEMSELVES (Viking Penguin 2009).  
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moralistically squeamish but ultimately accommodating responsible bonds dealer, might be an 
apt representative, not only of the ambivalent tort law of the nineteen twenties, but of our own 
tort law, and of our own attitudes, today.  And if so then that Nick Carraway-like tendency to 
blame the rich for their recklessness but then hold them harmless, may by now be as much a part 
of our American character, as is our much more remarked upon love for criminals – although 
with respect to the latter, we do then subject them to the most inhumane and punitive set of rules 
and institutions ever created on earth. 
As countless commentators have argued, Gatsby is indeed, partly, about that weird 
sadomasochistic love affair we Americans have with our criminals, so long as they wind up dead 
in the end, and whether or not for the wrong crime, and regardless of who pulls the trigger.   
Gatsby had to wind up dead, and if the blameless, non-culpable, out-of-his-mind-with-rage 
Wilson pulled the trigger, in revenge for a crime and a wrong Gatsby did not commit, well then 
all the better; because of it, Gatsby got his, Wilson got his, the Buchanans got out of the way, 
and Nick went back home.  We would do well to reflect on the tidiness of all that.  But by the 
same token, Gatsby is also about our tolerance, which we share with Nick, of the non-
accountability of the Buchanans for the vast numbers of private wrongs, many of them lethal, 
they inflict on others.  Tom is blameworthy, Nick famously decides at the end – he couldn't 
forgive him, he tells the reader – but he can hardly be held accountable.  There's no point in 
refusing to shake the man's hand, Nick concludes, Tom exhibits a kind of infantilism in his self-
justification that defies accountability.  So why bother.  It would be fruitless.  The tortfeasor – 
the wrongdoer – retreats into his money, away from accountability for the harms, injuries, and 
wrongs inflicted on others.   
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The tort law of private wrongs of that era reflected the same attitude toward the tortfeasor 
of means as Nick exhibits toward Tom.  Blame there was a-plenty: tort law – the "law of 
wrongs" – loudly proclaimed negligence to be a wrong, for which recompense should follow.  
Accountability, though, was almost completely absent.  The progressive reformers, for the 
noblest of reasons, did likewise.  The tort of negligence, they correctly saw, was unjustly 
hampered by its restrictive rules.  But that problem was swamped by the utter inapposite 
inadequacy of the idea of tort as a law of wrongs to address accidental injuries across the board: 
a wrong-based or fault-based system of justice after all could not even address, much less do so 
well, the problems of those injured in factories, on railroads, and in cars or by cars through no 
provable fault.  The reform proposals that followed – to dispense with fault altogether, and move 
toward an administrative system of compensation for injury – were and still are today a limited 
victory for those who are injured.  They also, however, discredited for the century that followed 
the idea – Nick’s idea – that carelessness that wrecks creatures and things is a wrong, and that 
justice requires its recompense.   
That idea, which for a few decades was central to the law of tort, is no longer.  It has been 
displaced.  To a considerable degree, tort-law-as-a-law-of-wrongs has been literally displaced by 
compensation schemes.  Even to the degree it hasn't, though, the “point” of tort law has been 
redefined:  Tort law is now conceived as a body of law that regulates the costs of accidents, or 
the allocation of risk, aiming, under either formulation, for an efficient distribution of resources 
rather than a righting of individual wrongs.  It is no longer really about fault, or wrongs, at all.  
Talk of fault has largely dropped out of the law of "accidents" while Twain's dark complaint – 
that no one is to blame – has become official dogma.  We don’t have, any longer, a “law of 
wrongs” that recognizably assigns blame and accountability for wrongful negligence.    
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That absence matters.  The law of wrongs, with its anything-but-crass notion of money 
damages as the appropriate response to the infliction of a private wrong, was a bulwark, albeit an 
inadequate one, against the human tendency to acquiesce in the non-accountability of powerful 
people for the wrecks they make of the lives of others.  We entered the twentieth century with 
that law almost still-birthed by virtue of the restrictive rules surrounding common law negligence 
inherited from the industrial era.  We ended the century with the very idea of fault-based tort-as-
wrong discredited, in the minds of advocates for victims no less than in the minds and actions of 
advocates for industry.  Who’s to blame for that?  Ronald Coase, his famous theorem, the law 
and economics movement of mid and late twentieth century, and the effort by those theorists and 
jurists and others to reformulate tort law as a body of rules designed to fill in gaps where 
information costs prevent parties from contracting, is no doubt a big part of the large reason why. 
Tort has been redefined by that movement as a body of default contract rules, in which the idea 
of “wrong” obviously has no place, displaced by the idea of hypothetical contractual intent.  That 
is not, however, the exclusive reason, nor is it the origin of the transformation of tort.  The 
progressive realist reformers of the twenties and thirties, disgusted with the inadequacies of tort 
law for accident victims, also had a role; it was these progressive minded victim friendly 
reformers, after all, that set this transformation in motion.  They did so with the entirely laudable 
and arguably feminist aim of providing more humane and more certain compensation to injured 
workers in the factories, passengers on the seas and on the rails, and eventually drivers and 
pedestrians injured or killed in automobile accidents.  Some of those injuries were the 
consequence of negligence, but of the non-provable or non-compensable kind.  Others were not 
the consequence of negligence at all.  They were not caused by cognizable “wrongs,” there was 
“no one to blame.”  But they all caused unsustainable hardship.  They all, then, were reconceived 
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as a social problem, requiring some measure of administered support from state coffers.  In the 
progressive reformers vision, the idea of fault then had no place, it was overshadowed by the 
imperative to help those in need “regardless of fault.” 
 The particular reform for which the progressive reformers argued – replacing the tort 
system with a compensation system, for all automobile accidents – did not succeed.  But the idea 
took root, indeed, it transformed the way we think of tort law in toto.  One relatively unremarked 
upon consequence of this transformative idea, by century's end, is simply that both the general 
idea of tort law as a “law of wrongs,” and the more specific idea of negligence as a wrong for 
which justice demands compensation, have died.  Contract law did not die during the century 
behind us – announcements of its death proved premature, to say the least.78  Contract law is 
enjoying quite a robust comeback from whatever minor threat was arguably posed to its 
dominance at midcentury by the consumer movement.  We've privatized everything from prisons 
and schools to civil procedure, using the law and mechanisms of contract law to do so.  It's the 
law of wrongs that died, and more specifically, the idea that animated it: the idea that negligence 
– a lack of care for the safety of others – is a private wrong, for which justice demands a private 
remedy.  That idea, so well expressed by Nick at the novel’s end, died.  It died in the 1920s or 
thereabouts – a casualty of a hit and run accident for which there was plenty of blame but no 
accountability, on a highway that cut through the Valley of Ashes, midway between Long 
Island's mansions and New York City's plush hotels. 
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